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MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19 
Brian JM Quinn * 
The conventional wisdom is that MAE/MACs in merger agree-
ments provide an opportunity for buyers to renegotiate merger 
agreements in the event of intervening adverse events. However, 
the experience following the COVID-19 outbreak suggests that the 
conventional wisdom is incorrect or at least overstated. In fact, 
MAE/MACs shift the risk of exogenous adverse events (like 
COVID-19) to buyers while leaving only the risks of adverse endog-
enous and semi-endogenous events with the seller. The conse-
quence of this risk-shifting is to strictly limit the circumstances 
under which a buyer can credibly lean on a MAE/MAC to threaten 
to terminate a merger agreement and initiate a renegotiation. Par-
ties to merger agreements appear to have internalized that lesson, 
as demonstrated by the relative paucity of renegotiations in the 
immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2020, Forescout Technologies filed a lawsuit seeking 
a declaratory judgment against Advent International.1 Forescout 
and Advent had signed a merger agreement in early February, 
some three months before.2 By May, it was becoming apparent to 
 
       *     Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Many thanks to Ms. Jihoo 
Kim for her valuable research assistance. 
 1. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout Commences Litigation Against Advent Inter-
national (May 20, 2020, 8:00 AM ET) [hereinafter Press Release, Forescout Litigation], 
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/05/20/2036337/0/en/Forescout-Commen 
ces-Litigation-Against-Advent-International.html [https://perma.cc/5GCT-KQFR]. 
 2. Id. 
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Forescout that Advent was suffering buyer’s remorse: a deal that 
looked good prior to the onset of a global pandemic looked less won-
derful after the U.S. economy ground to a halt in an effort to battle 
the spread of COVID-19. Forescout’s lawsuit sought a declaratory 
judgment from the court that COVID-19 did not represent a mate-
rial adverse event and an order that Advent proceed to closing of 
the transaction.3 Ultimately, Forescout and Advent settled the lit-
igation through a renegotiation downwards of the merger price and 
the transaction moved forward to closing.4 The Forescout litigation 
was one of a small number of cases that followed the onset of 
COVID-19 in the spring of 2020 in which buyers sought to walk 
away from merger agreements citing a material adverse effect.5 
While the Forescout story is consistent at first glance with the con-
ventional wisdom that parties use material adverse effect/material 
adverse change (“MAE/MAC”) clauses in merger agreements to fa-
cilitate renegotiation, the paucity of such efforts following the 
COVID-19 outbreak should cause us to re-evaluate that conven-
tional wisdom.6 This Article argues that the ambiguity that often 
serves the corporation law well has, by now, dissipated with re-
spect to MAE/MAC clauses, and there has been a fundamental 
change in the role of the MAE/MAC since 2001. The lack of ambi-
guity surrounding modern MAE/MAC clauses has, as a result, fun-
damentally changed the role MAE/MAC clauses play in merger 
agreements. Rather than act as a quasi-force majeure clause, with 
the seller bearing the burden of adverse shock, modern MAE/MAC 
clauses allocate exogenous risks to the buyer and endogenous risks 
to the seller consistent with the role described by Professors Gilson 
and Schwartz.7 Consequently, conventional wisdom that describes 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout and Advent International Reach Amended 
Merger Agreement (July 15, 2020, 9:00 AM ET) [hereinafter Press Release, Forescout 
Amended Agreement], https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/07/15/2062619/0 
/en/Forescout-and-Advent-International-Reach-Amended-Merger-Agreement.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8UA3-HV3A].  
 5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Azar Declares Pub-
lic Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) [herein-
after Press Release, Public Health Emergency], https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31 
/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WKN8-ZBRF]. 
 6. The material adverse effect clause is also known as the material adverse change 
clause. The two are fundamentally equivalent, and in this Article I will refer to them collec-
tively as MAE/MAC clauses or provisions. 
 7. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acqui-
sitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357 (2005). 
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MAE/MAC clauses as contractual devices that potentially facilitate 
efficient renegotiations in the face of adverse shocks is overstated.8  
The sudden onset of COVID-19 in spring 2020 was, and remains, 
a tsunami-like event. It was totally unexpected and swept across 
the economy with frightening speed. It also threatens to extend 
well into the foreseeable future. COVID-19 is precisely the kind of 
adverse event that the MAE/MAC clause in merger agreements is 
intended to protect signatories against. The COVID-19 outbreak 
gives us a unique opportunity to evaluate the role the MAE/MAC 
clause plays in merger contracting. Most transactions pending at 
the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. closed notwith-
standing the massive disruption brought on by the pandemic. In a 
small number of transactions, buyers refused to close, citing a 
MAE/MAC as the reason not to move forward with the merger. In 
three of those transactions, the parties sought to litigate the ques-
tion of a MAE/MAC (i.e., Simon v. Taubman,9 LVMH v. Tiffany,10 
and Forescout Technologies11), but ultimately settled their litiga-
tion by renegotiating the terms of their merger agreement. In Mi-
rae’s acquisition of Anbang’s hotel assets, a court refused to declare 
a MAE/MAC, but permitted the buyer to walk away for breach of a 
seller’s covenant.12 In another transaction, the parties agreed to 
terminate the transaction voluntarily (i.e., Victoria’s Secret13) ra-
ther than renegotiate or litigate the issue of whether there had 
been a MAE/MAC. 
 
 8. The former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court calls MAE/MAC clauses 
“renegotiation clauses.” Allison Frankel, COVID-19 MAE Cases Keep Ending with Revised 
Deals. That Wouldn’t Happen Without Litigation, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-mae/covid-19-mae-cases-keep-ending-with-revised-deals-th 
at-wouldnt-happen-without-litigation-idUSKBN27W2TH [https://perma.cc/2CL4-C4DM]. 
 9. Complaint at 1–2, Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Taubman Centers, Inc., No. 2020-
181675-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2020).  
 10. LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint at 2–3, Tiffany 
& Co. v. LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, C.A. No. 2020-0768-JRS (Del. Ch. Sept. 
28, 2020). 
 11. Press Release, Forescout Amended Agreement, supra note 4. 
 12. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL, 
2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020). 
 13. Verified Complaint at 1, Sycamore Partners III, L.P. v. L Brands, Inc., No. 2020-
0306, 2020 WL 2061416 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2020); James Fontella-Khan & Sujeet Indap, 
Sycamore and L Brands Call Off Victoria’s Secret Deal, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3f458e9c-e864-4fe1-8740-37136bae7b62 [https://perma.cc/94CS 
-HSP5]. 
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The MAE/MAC provision is one of a number of risk-shifting 
clauses in the merger contract. In most cases, the MAE/MAC does 
this by assigning the risk of exogenous material adverse events be-
tween signing and closing to the buyer and the risk of endogenous 
material adverse events to the seller.14 Because the MAE/MAC as-
signs the risk to the party best able to bear it, one can reasonably 
conclude that the MAE/MAC is an efficient term. Where there has 
been a MAE/MAC, the buyer is permitted to terminate the trans-
action and walk away, or the parties can renegotiate the terms of 
the agreement in order to facilitate an efficient transaction. Where 
there has been an adverse event that does not rise to a MAE, the 
buyer bears the risk of loss. However, because the MAE/MAC pro-
vision can act as a fulcrum for potential efficient renegotiations, 
the conventional wisdom is that the MAE/MAC provision has a 
subsidiary function as a renegotiation clause in the face of any ad-
verse shock.  
By now, it is clear, however, that courts are extremely reticent 
to permit a buyer to simply point to an adverse event between sign-
ing and closing and walk away from a transaction. Notwithstand-
ing courts’ reluctance, the conventional wisdom remains that fol-
lowing an adverse event, a buyer may lean on these clauses, and 
the threat of litigation, to push sellers to renegotiate the terms of 
merger agreements. This conventional wisdom overestimates the 
degree of judicial ambiguity surrounding modern MAE/MAC pro-
visions. Where the parties overestimate judicial ambiguity, buyers 
may be able to take advantage of bargaining dynamics to hold up 
the seller and shift the cost of adverse shocks, at least in part, to 
sellers rather than bear them themselves. Renegotiating in the ab-
sence of a true MAE/MAC represents an inefficient ex post distri-
bution of transaction surplus.  
This Article seeks to illustrate the role MAE/MACs play in the 
merger agreement and understand how they may affect bargaining 
dynamics that accompany renegotiations of merger agreements. In 
particular, this Article adds to the literature on merger contracting 
by observing that the conventional wisdom with respect to the role 
played by MAE/MACs misapprehends the role of a modern 
MAE/MAC provision.  
 
 14. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 339, 345–46 (observing the risk-shifting 
traits of the MAE/MAC clause). 
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This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I situates 
the discussion of the MAE/MAC as a lever for renegotiation by 
providing an overview of the conventional wisdom with respect to 
the role of MAE/MAC clauses following the occurrence of an ad-
verse shock. Part II provides an overview of the MAE/MAC clause 
in merger agreements, including an analysis of the work 
MAE/MAC clauses are intended to accomplish in the contracting 
process. Part III provides an overview of the current state of the 
doctrine with respect to MAE/MAC clauses in Delaware. Part IV 
discusses the experience of merger parties with renegotiations in 
the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. Specifically, this Part asks 
why there were so few renegotiations following the outbreak and 
how the conventional wisdom with respect to the role of MAE/MAC 
in renegotiations misapprehends its role. Finally, Part V summa-
rizes and concludes.   
I.  CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: MAE/MACS AS RENEGOTIATION 
CLAUSES 
The conventional wisdom holds that MAE/MAC clauses in mer-
ger agreements act as a fulcrum for efficient renegotiations in the 
face of adverse shocks between signing and closing. When faced 
with an adverse event that affects a seller’s valuation, buyers may 
point to a MAE/MAC clause in an attempt to credibly threaten to 
terminate the transaction, thereby pushing sellers to agree to re-
negotiate the terms of the merger.  
An example of such renegotiation during the COVID-19 pan-
demic involves private equity buyer Advent International’s acqui-
sition of Forescout Technologies. Forescout and Advent signed 
their merger agreement on February 6, 2020, with Advent paying 
$33 per share in cash for Forescout.15 By the time they signed their 
agreement, public health experts, though perhaps not the general 
public, were already on the alert for the growing threat of the 
COVID-19 outbreak in China. On January 31, 2020, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) had declared a Na-
tional Public Health Emergency that empowered HHS to begin to 
 
 15. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout to Be Acquired by Advent International in $1.9 
Billion Transaction (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.forescout.com/company/news/press-releases 
/forescout-to-be-acquired-by-advent-international-in-1.9-billion-transaction/ [https://perm 
a.cc/W2M6-7ULY]. 
QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  10:08 PM 
570 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:565 
respond to the threat of a pandemic in the U.S.16 It was not until 
March 13, 2020, more than a month after Forescout and Advent 
signed their agreement, that the President declared a National 
Emergency with respect to COVID-19.17 
By May, it was becoming apparent to Forescout that Advent was 
suffering buyer’s remorse: a deal that looked good prior to the onset 
of a global pandemic looked less wonderful after the U.S. economy 
ground to a halt in an effort to battle the spread of COVID-19. Alt-
hough Forescout had met all the conditions to closing the agree-
ment, Advent dragged its feet and refused to close. On May 20, 
2020, Forescout Technologies filed a lawsuit against Advent Inter-
national seeking a declaratory judgment that the COVID-19 pan-
demic did not constitute a material adverse event under the mer-
ger agreement, as well as an order that Advent proceed and close 
the transaction.18 The case was set for trial at the end of July 2020. 
Ultimately, Forescout and Advent settled the litigation through a 
renegotiation downwards of the merger price, and the transaction 
moved forward to closing.19 Rather than go to trial, on July 15, 
2020, Forescout and Advent agreed to an amended merger agree-
ment. Under the renegotiated terms, Forescout shareholders 
would receive $29/share (87% of the original deal price), and Ad-
vent would move to close the transaction.20 
At first blush, an observer might attribute the successful rene-
gotiation of the terms of the merger agreement to the effect of 
COVID-19, but there is ultimately little or no reason to believe that 
the pandemic was the cause. The parties had specifically carved 
out of the definition of MAE/MAC any epidemic or pandemic. Alt-
hough the onset of COVID-19 no doubt presented a challenge to 
Forescout and its business going forward, the contract clearly as-
signed the risk of this kind of adverse shock to Advent, the buyer. 
However, it subsequently came to light that in May 2020, during 
the executory period, the acquirer received a “whistle-blower” e-
 
 16. Press Release, Public Health Emergency, supra note 5. 
 17. Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the 
Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-conc 
erning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/3YTV-33PJ]. 
 18. Press Release, Forescout Litigation, supra note 1. 
 19. Press Release, Forescout Amended Agreement, supra note 4.    
 20. Id. 
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mail from an employee of Forescout alleging accounting impropri-
eties within the company. Unlike COVID-19, the risk of adverse 
internal shocks, like the disclosure of financial irregularities 
within the company, were risks assigned to the seller and not the 
buyer. Consequently, when Advent threatened to terminate the 
merger agreement unless the parties could renegotiate the terms 
due to disclosure of possible financial irregularities internal to 
Forescout, Advent’s threat was credible.21 This fuller story of 
Forescout and Advent is one that is recognizable to many in the 
deal world. It reflects the conventional wisdom with respect to 
MAE/MAC. However, it has little to do with the onset of COVID-
19. Nevertheless, the idea that MAE/MAC clauses can act as levers 
for renegotiation of contracts following an adverse shock like 
COVID-19 has taken hold amongst practitioners.22 Although 
slightly more hedged, a view that a MAE/MAC can act as a lever 
 
 21. Dean Seal, Investors Sue Forescout over Nixed $1.9B Advent Takeover, LAW360 
(June 11, 2020, 8:33 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1281979/investors-sue-
forescout-over-nixed-1-9b-advent-takeover [https://perma.cc/NX5A-UH5A]; Luis Sanchez, 
Why Forescout Is Taking a Much Lower Buyout Offer, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 4, 2020), https:// 
www.fool.com/investing/2020/08/04/why-forescout-is-taking-a-much-lower-buyout-offer.as 
px [https://perma.cc/6AE3-4V3H]. 
 22. Jessica DiNapoli, In Row with Tiffany, LVMH May Find That Most Sales Are Final, 
REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:32 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/tiffany-m-a-lvmh-dela 
ware-analysis-idUSKBN2691Q8 [https://perma.cc/42KW-D4BR] (describing renegotiation 
as an alternative to litigation); STEVEN M. BRAGG, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A CONDENSED 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 173 (2009) (noting that a MAE may serve to facilitate renegotiation 
of contract terms); Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Abbott’s Bid to Halt Purchase of Alere, the 
MAC Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/ 
business/dealbook/abbott-laboratories-alere-mac-clause.html [https://perma.cc/8N7N-D5 
3W] (“MAC assertions were really part of the negotiation dynamic among the parties as the 
financial crisis took hold. A buyer can invoke a MAC clause to try to drive down the price of 
an acquisition by taking advantage of either changed market conditions or adverse events 
affecting the target company.”); Nick Brown, Cerberus Seeks Lower Price on Innkeepers, 
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innkeepers/cerberus-seeks-
lower-price-on-innkeepers-sources-idUSTRE77N5MC20110824 [https://perma.cc/QA2R-88 
68] (“Most likely, Miller said, both sides will reopen talks and settle on a new takeover price, 
especially given that Cerberus and Chatham have already done due diligence.”); Abigail 
Hathaway, Buyer’s Remorse and “MAC Outs” in M&A Agreements, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Mar. 18, 2016), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/03/18/buyers-remorse-and-mac-
outs-in-ma-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/P64Z-S9Y9]; Revisiting the MAC Clause in Trans-
action Agreements: What Can Counsel Learn from the Credit Crisis?,  A.B.A.   (Aug. 20, 
2010), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2010/08/03_her 
man/ [https://perma.cc/64M3-W2RB]; 1 ABA MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH 
COMMENTARY 268 (Murray Perelman ed., 2d ed. 2010) (explaining that a buyer may prefer 
a price renegotiation rather than engaging in costly litigation over a MAE); Eric L. Talley, 
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 788 (2009) 
(“A number of practitioners . . . suggested that, in addition to concerns about uncertainty, 
one of the key reasons for a MAC/MAE provision is to provide a backdrop for possible deal 
restructuring should market conditions change.”). 
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to facilitate efficient renegotiation is by now widely accepted by ac-
ademics (the present author is not excluded from that number).23  
The conventional wisdom posits the MAE/MAC clause as a ful-
crum for renegotiations following adverse shocks, like COVID-19, 
between signing and closing. An adverse shock between signing 
and closing can reasonably be expected to reduce the valuation of 
the seller in the eyes of the buyer. Whether any such decline is 
sufficient to rise to the level that a court would declare the adverse 
event a MAE/MAC is thought to be ambiguous. According to con-
ventional wisdom, due to this judicial ambiguity buyers can credi-
bly threaten to invoke the MAE/MAC clause to terminate the mer-
ger agreement and force a renegotiation that transfers transaction 
surplus from the seller to the buyer, thus causing the seller to 
share in at least a portion of the losses sustained by adverse shocks 
prior to signing. The conventional wisdom, while not entirely in-
correct, does, as we shall see, tend to overstate the case with re-
spect to the utility of the MAE/MAC as a renegotiation clause.   
 
 23. CLAIRE HILL, BRIAN JM QUINN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 364 (2d ed. 2019) (noting the role MAE clauses 
play in facilitating renegotiations); David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias, Material Adverse 
Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics, 48 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 819, 819 (2013) 
(finding that MACs are responsible for 80% of renegotiations of merger agreements in their 
sample); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC 
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2089 (2009) 
(“Because some level of disruption in the party’s business is highly foreseeable, and because 
the actual disruption is not likely to MAC the business, a counterparty declaring a MAC on 
the basis of materializing agreement risks is likely to be behaving opportunistically [by re-
negotiating the merger contract].”); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in 
Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 888–92 (2010) (ar-
guing that vague MAE clauses are efficient partly because vague judicial standards facili-
tate renegotiation); Eric Talley, Drew O’Kane, Christian Kellner & Alexander Stremitzer, 
The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses 
in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 181, 183 (2012); Steven 
M. Davidoff & Kristen Baiardi, Accredited Home Lenders v. Lone Star Funds: A MAC Case 
Study 19 (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-
16, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092115 [https://perma.cc/P 
HM9-LQSJ] (reasoning that if a buyer credibly asserts a MAE, then both parties have in-
centives to renegotiate to a lower price to avoid an all-or-nothing litigation outcome). 
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II.  THE ROLE OF THE MAE/MAC IN MERGER AGREEMENTS 
In contracts, “a deal’s a deal” is the rule.24 In contracts, parties 
may at times seek to excuse performance of their obligations, rely-
ing on the doctrines of impracticability and frustration.25 To the 
extent there are foreseeable risks, parties making unqualified 
promises to perform necessarily assume an obligation to perform 
even if the occurrence of a foreseeable adverse event makes perfor-
mance impracticable. Absent contractual strategies to limit one’s 
obligation to perform, courts will traditionally enforce parties’ 
agreements. These basic contractual doctrines are no less true in 
the context of mergers and acquisitions, where parties are typically 
represented by sophisticated counsel and negotiations are usually 
meticulously fought.  
The terms of merger agreements are highly negotiated. Rather 
than rely on doctrines of excuse, like impracticability and frustra-
tion, parties to merger agreements have the ability to look forward 
and envision a limited set of scenarios that might give rise to con-
tractual rights to terminate the merger agreement pursuant to its 
terms and thus avoid the expense and risk involved in litigating 
excused performance. For example, merger agreements typically 
include numerous conditions; failure of any condition at closing 
will relieve the buyer from the obligation to complete the transac-
tion. One such condition is a successful shareholder vote. In the 
event shareholders do not vote to approve the transaction, the con-
dition requiring a vote fails and the buyer is permitted to walk 
away from the transaction without incurring a penalty. Other com-
mon conditions include government approval, required approvals 
by other private third parties (e.g., landlords), and financing enti-
ties, to name a few.  
The traditional role of a material adverse change clause in a 
merger agreement has been functionally equivalent to that of a 
force majeure clause, which acts to excuse performance in the 
 
 24. Waukesha Foundry v. Indus. Eng’g, 91 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Pacta sunt 
servanda, or, ‘a deal’s a deal.’”). 
 25. The doctrine of impracticability excuses performance of a duty, where the said duty 
has become unfeasibly difficult or expensive for the party who was to perform. See E. ALAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 624, 626 (4th ed. 2004). Frustration of purpose occurs when an 
unforeseen event undermines a party’s principal purpose for entering into a contract such 
that the performance of the contract is radically different from performance of the contract 
that was originally contemplated by both parties. Id. at 634. 
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event an adverse shock between signing and closing makes perfor-
mance by the buyer impracticable or frustrates the buyer’s pur-
pose.26 In that sense, the traditional MAE/MAC negotiated as part 
of the merger agreement acts to excuse the buyer from perfor-
mance.27 The role of the MAE/MAC clause has changed over time, 
shifting it away from that of force majeure clauses to excuse buyer 
performance in the event of adverse shocks to one that ensures 
buyer performance in spite of adverse shocks.  
In the context of a merger agreement, the material adverse effect 
clause operates as a condition to closing, as a representation, 
and/or to qualify a representation.28 The typical closing condition 
states that a buyer need not close the transaction in the event there 
has been a material adverse effect.29 In the alternative, the 
MAE/MAC representation (the “back-door MAC”) forms the basis 
for a termination right when read together with the “bringdown 
condition.” The bringdown condition refreshes the seller’s repre-
sentations as of the closing date. To the extent there has been a 
material adverse change, the seller’s representation will not cor-
rect when the representations are brought down to the closing, 
thus triggering a failure of the condition.30 In either event, a mate-
rial adverse change between signing and closing permits the buyer 
to decline to close the transaction for failure of a condition and then 
terminate the transaction pursuant to its terms, walking away 
 
 26. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
 27. I use the term “traditional MAE/MAC” in the manner used by Gilson and Schwartz 
to describe a MAE/MAC without any carveouts. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7; see 
also infra Part III (discussion of MAE/MAC structure). 
 28. A representation that there has not been a MAE/MAC is known as a “back-door 
MAC.” See, e.g., James R. Griffin, 2009 M&A Deal Point Study: Strategic Buyer/Public Tar-
gets, M&A LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 4. 
 29. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger Between Ferrari Group Holdings, L.P., 
Ferrari Merger Sub, Inc., and Forescout Technologies, Inc. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 7.2(d) 
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1145057/000110465920012189/tm2 
06949d3_ex2-1.htm [https://perma.cc/3GPY-BYLW] (“No Company Material Adverse Effect 
will have occurred after the date of this Agreement that is continuing.”). In addition to the 
bringdown condition, parties to complex contracts will also negotiate stand-alone termina-
tion provisions that permit one or both parties to terminate the pending contract pursuant 
to its terms. The fiduciary termination right is a common termination provision, as is the 
termination right triggered by what is known as the “drop dead date.” 
 30. Id. § 7.2(a)(ii) (“The representations and warranties . . . that are qualified by [a] 
Company Material Adverse Effect . . . [are] true and correct in all respects . . . as of the 
Closing Date as if made at and as of the Closing Date.”). 
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without paying a termination fee or damages.31 In addition to the 
bringdown condition, parties often negotiate a MAE as a separate 
termination right. The MAE/MAC termination right functions 
slightly differently from the bringdown condition. The bringdown 
condition permits the buyer to decline to close once the seller 
makes a determination that the seller has otherwise comported 
with the conditions to closing. The MAE/MAC termination right, 
on the other hand, permits the buyer to declare a MAE/MAC and 
proactively terminate the merger agreement without necessarily 
giving the seller the opportunity to cure the MAE/MAC or waiting 
for the seller to close the transaction.  
A.  Structure of a Typical MAE Clause 
The material adverse effect clause is made up of three basic com-
ponents. In the first instance, the MAE/MAC places residual post-
signing risks with the seller. The MAE/MAC is typically defined as 
a circumstance that has or would reasonably be expected to have a 
material adverse effect on the business or the financial condition 
or results of operations of the target company.32 Of course, this def-
inition of a MAE/MAC is almost impossibly vague. In general, how-
ever, the use of this traditional formulation of the MAE/MAC 
makes it clear that if, during the interim between signing and clos-
ing, a material adverse shock occurs, then the seller bears the cost 
of that adverse shock and not the buyer, who will not be required 
to close. 
Second, parties negotiate to trim back the buyer’s ability to walk 
away from the deal by carving out from the definition of a material 
adverse event certain foreseeable exogenous adverse events that 
lie out of the control of both parties, like adverse changes in the 
general economic conditions, financial markets, or regulatory, leg-
islative or political conditions, among others.33 The effect of each of 
these carveouts is to limit the application of the broad MAE/MAC 
definition by excluding certain categories of foreseeable exogenous 
 
 31. Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and 
the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 820 (2010) (“[T]he MAC clause 
allows the acquirer to costlessly avoid closing the deal if the target’s business suffers a suf-
ficiently adverse change during the executory period.”). 
 32. Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-Usage Analysis of Material Adverse Change Provisions, 
10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 9, 17 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 43–44. 
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adverse events. Although they might look like boilerplate, the 
events carved out of the MAE/MAC definition are often highly ne-
gotiated. For example, it is common for parties to agree to carve 
out from the MAE/MAC definition certain force majeure events, 
like earthquakes, floods, wildfires or other natural disasters, 
weather conditions, pandemics, and other force majeure events.34 
Professor Miller breaks down the various carveouts into three sep-
arate categories: systematic risks (associated with general changes 
in the economy, financial markets, and the industry of the target); 
indicator risks (associated with the target’s financial performance, 
including failure to meet financial projections and the estimates of 
industry analysts); and finally agreement risks (associated with 
adverse effects directly tied to execution of the merger agree-
ment).35 To the extent a material adverse event occurs between 
signing and closing and it falls under one of these exceptions, it 
cannot form the basis for the buyer to terminate the merger agree-
ment. The implication of the carveouts is to place the risk of certain 
foreseeable exogenous events back on to the buyer, leaving the tar-
get holding only adverse risks endogenous to the target.  
The third component of the MAE definition is the disproportion-
ate-effect language that modifies all or some of the carveouts. Par-
ties will often negotiate a carveout for a particular adverse exoge-
nous event (e.g., an adverse change in financial markets), so if in 
the event of a market collapse between signing and closing, that 
collapse would not be considered a material adverse effect, unless 
the target company suffered a disproportionately large loss rela-
tive to other firms in the same industry as a result of the collapse.36 
The intent of the disproportionate-effect language is to claw back 
at least some of the risk protection given the seller through the 
broad carveouts for downturns in the economic climate, financial 
markets, natural disasters, as well as pandemics like COVID-19. 
To the extent a financial downturn or natural disaster adversely 
affects the entire sector in which the target operates, it may nev-
ertheless be a MAE if the target, for reasons endogenous to the 
 
 34. Force Majeure Clauses—Checklists and Sample Wording, WORLD BANK GROUP 
PUB.-PRIV.-PARTNERSHIP LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/ppp-overview/practical-tools/checklists-and-risk-matrices/force-majeure-check-
list [https://perma.cc/58A5-2JNS]. 
 35. Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC 
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2073–89 
(2009). 
 36. Adams, supra note 32, at 43–44; see also infra Appendix, Representative MAE. 
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target, is more significantly affected than its industry competitors. 
In this way, the carveouts play an important screening function. 
Adverse shocks that have idiosyncratic effects on the target, 
though the shocks are ostensibly exogenous, may reveal hidden in-
formation about the target. In that way, the disproportionate-ef-
fects language helps screen for semi-endogenous risks (exogenous 
risks that have idiosyncratic effects on the target) and assigns 
those risks to the seller rather than the buyer. 
The structure of the modern MAE/MAC provision differs signif-
icantly from the traditional MAE/MAC. The addition of numerous 
carveouts for systemic, indicator and agreement risks allocates the 
risk of these adverse exogenous events between signing and closing 
to the buyer, thus turning the traditional MAE/MAC on its head. 
While the buyer holds the risk of exogenous events, the target 
bears endogenous and semi-endogenous risks, which are all osten-
sibly within the control of the target. 
B.  Rationales for the MAE/MAC Provision 
The so-called traditional MAE/MAC includes only the first com-
ponent of this three-part formulation.37 In that form, the tradi-
tional MAE/MAC is a highly buyer-favorable provision that acts 
effectively like a typical force majeure clause. Although more com-
mon in international commercial contracts, a typical force majeure 
clause excuses performance in the event of an exogenous event that 
could not be reasonably foreseen at the time of contracting, the ef-
fects of which cannot be reasonably mitigated by the party seeking 
to avoid performance.38 Under the common law, contracting parties 
can be excused from performance under the doctrine of impractica-
bility or the related doctrine of frustration.39  
 
 37. Gilson & Schwartz term the MAE without any carve outs a “traditional” MAE. See 
Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 331–37. 
 38. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP CLAUSES (Mar. 
2020), https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-clauses 




 39. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 789 (arguing that MAE/MAC clauses implicate the tra-
ditional contract doctrine of frustration). 
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Like its cousin force majeure, impracticability requires the oc-
currence of an event that attacks the basic assumption of the con-
tract. As with force majeure, there must be an occurrence of a con-
dition, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the 
contract, that makes performance extremely expensive or difficult 
to complete; further, the impracticability must have resulted with-
out the fault of the party seeking to be excused.40 For a court to 
determine that a party may excuse performance under the doctrine 
of frustration, that party must first show that the adverse event 
“substantially frustrated” the party’s “principal purpose”; second, 
the party must show that the purpose was a “basic assumption” of 
the contract; third, frustration must have resulted without fault of 
the party seeking to be excused; and finally, the party seeking to 
be excused must not assume a greater obligation than the law im-
poses.41 Professor Schwartz observes that although frustration and 
impracticability are extremely high bars for contract performance, 
parties can, and do, negotiate frustration clauses that lower the 
bar for relief by relying on materiality qualifiers.42  
Like a force majeure clause, a negotiated frustration clause may 
also include a list of specific adverse events, the occurrence of 
which will presumptively result in an excusal from performance. 
Unlike a force majeure clause, such events more typically involve 
the economic atmosphere that gives incentive to the transaction, 
like “severe reduction in demand” or “radically changed market 
conditions.”43 Central to the understanding of the traditional 
MAE/MAC as a force majeure/frustration clause is that the occur-
rence of an exogenous material adverse event gives rise to a right 
by the buyer to terminate the transaction and walk away. To the 
extent the adverse event lies within the control of the buyer, the 
buyer may not rely on the clause to terminate the transaction.44  
In their influential paper on MAE/MAC clauses, Professors Gil-
son and Schwartz explain the role of the MAE/MAC in merger 
 
 40. 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 9.6 (2d ed. 1998); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 41. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 9.7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 42. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 806–07. 
 43. Id. at 810. 
 44. See id. at 812 (“A ‘reduction in demand,’ for instance, might be due to changing 
tastes of fickle consumers (an exogenous cause) or a poorly executed advertising campaign 
(an endogenous cause).”). 
QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  10:08 PM 
2021] MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19 579 
agreements, as well as the expansion in the use of exceptions to the 
MAE/MAC clause in recent years.45 Gilson and Schwartz advance 
two possible explanations for the extensive use of MAE/MACs in 
merger agreements. First is the symmetry hypothesis. Under the 
symmetry hypothesis, the traditional MAE/MAC exists to provide 
symmetry for buyers against an effective judicial out that sellers 
have.46 Development of the takeover jurisprudence starting in the 
mid-1980s gave rise to the judicial obligations of sellers to include 
fiduciary termination rights in merger agreements.47 The tradi-
tional MAE/MAC steps into the breach and provides buyers a 
roughly symmetrical equivalent to the seller’s fiduciary termina-
tion right—if between signing and closing circumstances dramati-
cally change to reduce the value of the target, the buyer is permit-
ted to terminate the transaction.48 In that sense, the MAE/MAC 
plays the role of the force majeure/frustration clause as predicted 
by Professors Gilson and Schwartz. However, Gilson and Schwartz 
find a lack of empirical support for this position.49 
The second hypothesis Professors Gilson and Schwartz put for-
ward is the investment hypothesis.50 Because the traditional 
MAE/MAC imposes exogenous risks on the target, the investment 
hypothesis holds that buyers and sellers agree to include carveouts 
to the MAE/MAC definition to reduce the degree of ambiguity as-
sociated with the MAE/MAC provision. This creates incentives for 
the target to continue to make corporate investments necessary be-
tween signing and closing (i.e., to overcome moral hazard inherent 
in the last-period problem).51 A secondary result of the investment 
hypothesis is to flip the assignment of exogenous risks from the 
seller to the buyer and to, in effect, curtail the ability of the 
MAE/MAC to act as a force majeure/frustration clause. On the 
other hand, assigning exogenous risks to the buyer is more efficient 
 
 45. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 330. 
 46. Id. at 336. 
 47. Id. at 335. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 345. 
 50. Id. at 349. 
 51. Id. at 345; see Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947–1953 (2003) (discussing the last-period problem in merger 
transactions). 
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because the costs of an exogenous risk, which will only really ma-
terialize after the closing of the transaction, are borne by the buyer 
and not the seller.52 
At the time of Gilson and Schwartz’s article in 2005, contracting 
practices typically limited the use of carveouts to deals involving 
technology sector targets. Gilson and Schwartz observed an in-
creasing tendency in the high technology sector to expand the list 
of carveouts, the effect of which is to shift the risk of undiversifia-
ble, exogenous adverse events from the target to the buyer in tech-
nology transactions.53 Gilson and Schwartz argued that such an 
observation was consistent with their investment hypothesis. They 
predicted that carveouts would become common in transactions re-
quiring important post-signing seller investments to maintain the 
value of the target going forward, like technology businesses and 
businesses dependent on critical human resources.54  
Although the symmetry theory is attractive, Gilson and 
Schwartz found that it lacks empirical support.55 The symmetry 
theory suggests reliance on a traditional MAE/MAC where the 
costs of exogenous risks are borne by the seller. However, the in-
creasing reliance on carveouts in business sectors susceptible to 
post-signing moral hazard suggests that the option value of sym-
metrical walk rights is low relative to other potential explanations 
for the use of MAE/MAC provisions. Gilson and Schwartz conclude 
that by shifting the cost of exogenous risks to the buyer through 
the use of carveouts and leaving the costs of endogenous risks with 
the seller, the merger contract better mitigates post-signing moral 
hazard and more efficiently allocates risks to the parties best posi-
tioned to absorb them.56  
While Gilson and Schwartz theorize the motivations for 
MAE/MAC clauses and the carveouts, Professors Choi and Triantis 
add to Gilson and Schwartz’s analysis by introducing the effect of 
vagueness of the MAE/MAC contract term on bargaining dynam-
ics.57 Although commentators have urged on practitioners the 
 
 52. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 346–47. 
 53. Id. at 332–33. 
 54. See id. at 340. 
 55. Id. at 349. 
 56. See id. at 345. 
 57. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 23, at 854. 
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adoption of numerical triggers to MAE/MAC conditions, dealmak-
ers have steadfastly resisted such entreaties. They instead rely on 
more vague descriptions of material adverse events for purposes of 
the MAE/MAC clause, leaving definition of a MAE/MAC to the 
courts.58  
Choi and Triantis observe that rather than mistakes, decisions 
by drafters to avoid specificity with respect to the MAE/MAC defi-
nition are strategic choices.59 They argue that vagueness in the 
MAE/MAC definition generates incentives that help the parties 
overcome the problems of asymmetric information in the contract-
ing.60 The role of carveouts in the MAE/MAC definition, they argue, 
is to reduce noise and sharpen the effectiveness of the MAE/MAC 
as a signal for private information.61 In addition, vagueness asso-
ciated with the MAE/MAC provision facilitates efficient renegotia-
tion of merger agreements following adverse shocks that have the 
effect of reducing the buyer’s valuation of the target.62 Vagueness 
results in enforcement costs associated with litigating the merger 
agreement. Because sellers must bear the costs of enforcement, the 
litigation costs associated with enforcing a MAE/MAC provision 
can act as a screen to extract additional private information from 
the seller and promote efficient renegotiations.63 Only where the 
seller believes there to be a credible threat with respect to judicial 
enforcement of the merger contract will it pursue litigation and en-
forcement. Where the seller’s litigation threat is not credible, be-
cause the seller has reason to know, given its private information, 
that adverse shock exceeds the judicial threshold for a MAE/MAC, 
sellers will have an incentive to pursue renegotiation.64 Such rene-
gotiations may be efficient because only “good” sellers who have 
private information and know their likelihood of success on their 
MAE/MAC claim is high will pursue costly litigation, while sellers 
who have private information that suggests their MAE/MAC claim 
will fail will not have an incentive to pursue such litigation.65 With 
private seller information about the nature of the adverse shock 
 
 58. See id. at 880–81. 
 59. Id. at 855. 
 60. Id. at 859. 
 61. Id. at 867. 
 62. See id. at 891–92. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 891. 
 65. See id. at 894–95. 
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with respect to the seller so revealed, buyers and sellers can suc-
cessfully renegotiate, efficiently shift costs associated with the ad-
verse shock to the seller, and move to closing.66 
The challenge with a critique that MAE/MAC provisions are too 
vague is that it suggests there is a normal distribution of judicial 
outcomes around the mean definition of a MAE. It further assumes 
courts will almost randomly determine that some events rise to the 
level of a MAE/MAC and others do not, and that buyers and sellers 
cannot reliably predict how a court might rule when asked to de-
termine the meaning of the provisions. This seemingly random dis-
tribution of judicial outcomes gives rise to ambiguity with respect 
to determining whether any specific adverse shock will potentially 
receive a judicial determination of a MAE/MAC. However, with re-
spect to MAE/MAC provisions, courts in Delaware have only ever 
once permitted a buyer to walk away from a merger agreement due 
to a MAE/MAC.67 This suggests that rather than being strategi-
cally vague, there is a high degree of predictability with respect to 
how courts will find on legal challenges seeking to enforce claimed 
MAE/MACs. As a consequence, when sellers agree to negotiate in 
response to a buyer’s refusal to close, they are not necessarily re-
vealing private information about the nature of the adverse shock, 
but are rather exhibiting risk aversion (i.e., overestimating their 
own litigation risk). 
III.  WHAT DO COURTS SAY ABOUT MAE/MAC CLAUSES? 
Typically, in contract, when parties reach an agreement on a 
bargain, courts will enforce the agreement. The fact that circum-
stances may have changed between signing and closing does not 
generate a per se right for parties to walk away from their obliga-
tions under the terms of the agreement. Courts have developed a 
number of doctrines of excuse (e.g., the doctrines of frustration, im-
practicability, and force majeure) that will excuse contractual per-
formance.68 Rather than rely on these doctrines of excuse, in the 
 
 66. Id. at 896. 
 67. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
325 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (finding a MAE and permitting buyer to terminate a merger 
agreement). 
 68. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70–71 (W.D. Pa. 
1980) (“The doctrine of mistake of fact requires that the mistake relate to a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made. The doctrine of impracticability requires that the non-
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context of merger agreements, parties lean on MAE/MAC provi-
sions to contract around the obligations to close in situations where 
impracticability or frustration might otherwise arise. That said, 
courts are hesitant to reach the conclusion that a MAE/MAC has 
occurred that will allow buyers to walk away from a merger agree-
ment.69 Prior to the 2010s, that hesitance might well have be at-
tributed to the inherent vagueness of the material adverse effect 
clause itself. However, recent cases make it clear that courts and 
dealmakers have internalized the prevailing academic view of the 
MAE/MAC, and that the court’s hesitance to enforce is due not to 
vagueness of the contracted term, but to the changed nature of the 
provision’s purpose. 
The earlier view of the MAE/MAC as a broad force majeure/frus-
tration clause has, over time, given way in the context of merger 
contracting to a contrary provision that, in effect, reads out com-
mon law performance excuses and turns the MAE/MAC into a risk-
shifting provision that places the burden of adverse exogenous 
events—including force majeure events—on the buyer and not the 
seller. Of the MAE/MAC cases, there are three that are important 
for understanding the development of the Delaware courts’ doc-
trine in this area: In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,70 Hexion 
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,71 and Akorn v. Frese-
nius.72 In IBP, the court was asked to apply a traditional 
MAE/MAC. Later, in Hexion and Akorn, following developments in 
contracting practice, the thinking of courts evolved to reflect the 
current merger contracting practices with respect to modern 
MAE/MAC provisions. 
 
occurrence of the ‘event’, . . . or the non-existence of the ‘fact’, . . . causing the impracticability 
be a basic assumption on which the contract is made.” (citations omitted)). 
 69. Timothy Harkness, Kate Apostolova & Nathan Hembree, Do I Have to Go Through 
With This? A Summary of Recently Filed MAE/MAC Cases, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS 
DERINGER L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2020), https://blog.freshfields.us/post/102g53q/do-i-have-to-go-
through-with-this-a-summary-of-recently-filed-mae-mac-cases [https://perma.cc/25FG-9J 
5S] (“[T]ransaction terminations based on the occurrence of an MAE/MAC are rare, and the 
standard by which Delaware courts judge whether an MAE/MAC has occurred is incredibly 
high.”). 
 70. 789 A.2d 14, 52 (Del. Ch. 2001). Although IBP involved a Delaware court interpret-
ing New York law, its reasoning was later adopted in toto by the Delaware Chancery Court 
in Frontier Oil. Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., C.A. No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, 
at *127–28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005). 
 71. 965 A.2d 715, 738 (2008). 
 72. Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325. 
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 A.  IBP Shareholders Litigation 
In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation is perhaps the best 
known, and most important, of the MAE/MAC cases.73 Although 
IBP was decided by a Delaware court interpreting New York law, 
it is nevertheless the seminal case for thinking about the 
MAE/MAC.74 In IBP, Tyson Foods, the nation’s leading chicken dis-
tributor, sought to walk away from an agreement to acquire IBP, 
the number-one beef and number-two pork distributor in the coun-
try, following a vigorous auction.75 Tyson’s decision to attempt to 
terminate the merger agreement was preceded by a severe winter, 
which adversely affected the performance of both Tyson and IBP 
equally, as well as the disclosure of financial irregularities at an 
IBP subsidiary.76 Tyson pointed to both of these and sought to ex-
ercise its right to avoid performance due to there being a material 
adverse effect.77   
The MAE clause in IBP was a traditional MAC in that it con-
tained only the first of the three components of the now-typical 
MAE formulation.78 There was no language carving out exceptions 
to the definition or disproportionate effect on the seller.79 The cen-
tral question for the court in IBP involved an interpretation of the 
definition of the traditional MAE/MAC that gave rise to Tyson’s 
purported right to avoid performance. The traditional MAE/MAC 
relied on by the parties in IBP was drafted with purposefully broad 
and vague language.80 IBP’s traditional MAE/MAC played the role 
of a force majeure/frustration clause. Such clauses are broadly 
drafted but typically provide for a termination right in the event of 
a specified adverse event (e.g., war, rebellion, earthquakes, 
 
 73. 789 A.2d at 52.  
 74. Although IBP is not precedent, the reasoning in IBP was later adopted in Frontier 
Oil. See Frontier Oil Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *128. 
 75. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 21. 
 76. Id. at 22, 27–28. 
 77. Id. at 51–52. 
 78. See supra section II.A. 
 79. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 65–66. 
 80. Id. at 65 (“Under the contract, a material adverse effect (or ‘MAE’) is defined as ‘any 
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or rea-
sonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect’ . . . ‘on the condition (financial 
or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [IBP] and [its] Subsidi-
aries taken as whole. . . .’”). 
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drought, flood, etc.) during the pre-closing period.81 IBP’s MAE/ 
MAC definition mirrored such a clause but without the enumer-
ated list of adverse events.  
In evaluating the buyer’s claims, the court read the role of the 
traditional MAE/MAC as that of a force majeure/frustration clause 
and laid out a three-pronged approach to interpreting these provi-
sions: 
[E]ven where a Material Adverse Effect condition is as broadly written 
as the one in the Merger Agreement, that provision is best read as a 
backstop protecting the acquiror from [1] the occurrence of unknown 
events that [2] substantially threaten the overall earnings potential 
of the target in [3] a durationally-significant manner. A short-term 
hiccup in earnings would not suffice; rather the Material Adverse Ef-
fect should be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective 
of a reasonable acquiror.82 
It is left to the finder of fact to determine whether the adverse 
event in question rises to the level of a MAE/MAC so as to trigger 
the buyer’s right to walk. The key for the court’s understanding 
whether an adverse event is material for purposes of the 
MAE/MAC must be “viewed from the longer-term perspective of 
the reasonable acquirer.”83 The buyer, after all, buys the company 
for the long term and is not necessarily dissuaded by short term 
blips in performance or ambient economic conditions that it will 
have to endure in any event beginning immediately following clos-
ing of the transaction.84  
Of course, Delaware courts typically eschew bright-line rules 
and view this kind of ambiguity as a net positive for the application 
of the corporate law.85 In IBP, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that a 
“broadly written” MAE provision “is best read as a backstop pro-
tecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events. . . .”86 
Broadly drafted provisions grant a high degree of discretion to the 
 
 81. See, e.g., Force Majeure Clauses—Checklists and Sample Wording, supra note 34; 
Practical Guidance, Commercial Clause Description—Miscellaneous: Force Majeure, 
BLOOMBERG L. (2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/corporate/document/XD6TO 
5TS000000 [https://perma.cc/AY5Y-6TWS]. 
 82. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 67 (“It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip in 
earnings as material, so long as the target’s earnings-generating potential is not materially 
affected by that blip or the blip’s cause.”). 
 85. William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894 (1997). 
 86. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68. 
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finder of fact and may improve efficiency in contract drafting as 
parties will inevitably find the ex ante cost of specifying all mate-
rial risks to the contract prohibitively expensive.87 In that sense, 
the MAE/MAC provision acts as a force majeure clause. In a foot-
note, Vice Chancellor Strine remarked that the court’s approach to 
interpreting traditional MAE/MAE clauses “as addressing funda-
mental events that would materially affect the value of a target to 
a reasonable acquiror eliminates the need for drafting [extremely 
detailed MAC clauses with numerous carveouts or qualifiers]” akin 
to the way drafters typically draft force majeure provisions, which 
will include specific lists of “act of God” events that will presump-
tively result in a termination right by the buyer.88 
Because this definition of a MAE/MAC is forward-looking, it is, 
as Choi and Triantis observe, necessarily vague. As the well-known 
American philosopher Yogi Berra once said, “‘It’s tough to make 
predictions, especially about the future.’”89 Adverse events that oc-
cur during the eight-to-twelve-week pre-closing period rarely an-
nounce themselves as durationally significant.90 Indeed, it is nor-
mally impossible for an informed observer to accurately predict 
whether an adverse event will be sufficiently long-lasting as to af-
fect the long-term earnings potential of the target and thus trigger 
the MAE/MAC condition.91 Consequently, the traditional 
MAE/MAC formulation is sufficiently vague as to be an invitation 
to litigation in the manner predicted by Choi and Triantis. 
B.  Huntsman v. Hexion 
The global financial crisis of 2008, like the COVID-19 outbreak, 
represented a rapid and dramatic shift in economic performance 
 
 87. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 43–68 (1996). 
 88. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68 n.155. 
 89. The Perils of Prediction, ECONOMIST (May 31, 2007), https://www.economist.com/ 
books-and-arts/2007/05/31/the-perils-of-prediction [https://perma.cc/Z6WY-8ME7] (attrib-
uting the quote to Yogi Berra). 
 90. Cf. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 67 (discussing how a short-term hiccup would not 
amount to an adverse event, and a durationally significant adverse event usually spans 
years, not mere months). 
 91. Cf. Robert Malionek & Jon Weichselbaum, Five Keys to Analyzing a Material Ad-
verse Effect, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/five-keys-ana 
lyzing-material-adverse-effect-ny-law-journal [https://perma.cc/XG5K-N7SL] (explaining 
how it is difficult to determine whether an event is materially adverse, and in particular, 
the difficulty in determining whether an event is durationally significant). 
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across the entire economy. As lending markets froze, the prospects 
for private-equity-sponsored deals dimmed. Illiquid credit markets 
were especially difficult for pending transactions. Buyers entered 
into transactions thinking that they would be able to rely on the 
financial markets to provide the necessary financing but then were 
left unable to complete transactions when these markets froze.92 
Hexion was one such case where the sudden illiquidity of lending 
markets caused the buyer to engage in second thoughts about the 
wisdom of the proposed acquisition.93  
Following a competitive bidding process for Huntsman Corp. in 
July 2007, Hexion agreed to “pay a substantially higher price than 
the competition and to commit to stringent deal terms, including 
no ‘financing out.’”94 Consequently, the buyer took on the risk of 
being able to secure financing to make the deal happen. However, 
following difficulties in the financial markets in June 2008, Hexion 
sought to walk away from the transaction by filing suit, making 
two arguments. 95 First, that financing in the amount necessary to 
complete the transaction was no longer available in the market; 
and second, even if Hexion were able to secure financing to com-
plete the transaction as proposed, the combined entity would be 
immediately insolvent.96 The buyer sought a declaratory order 
from the court that Huntsman had suffered an MAE/MAC under 
the terms of the merger agreement and that the buyer would no 
longer be required to close the transaction.97  
By the time of the Hexion litigation, market practice and the un-
derstanding of the courts with respect to the role of the MAE had 
already changed. IBP market practice limited the use of 
MAE/MAC carveouts to deals in the technology sector. However, 
by the time of Hexion, some eight years later, carveouts to the 
MAE/MAC definition had become much more common.98 Unlike 
 
 92. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Hunstman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 720–21, 
731 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing a situation where the buyer wanted to back out of a merger 
after an illiquid and frozen credit market caused the buyer to lack sufficient funds to close 
the transaction).  
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 721. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 722. 
 98. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 330, 340, 350, 354–55 (observing that carveouts 
to the MAE/MAC definition are typically limited to the buyers and sellers in the technology 
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IBP, where the parties agreed to a traditional MAE/MAC, in Hex-
ion the parties negotiated a “narrowly tailored” MAE/MAC defini-
tion.99 The MAE/MAC agreed to in the Hexion transaction included 
a number of carveouts subject to disproportionate-effects language 
(semi-endogenous risks). The carveout that was most directly rele-
vant to the litigation was the disproportionate-effect analysis of the 
carveout that excluded changes in general economic or financial 
market conditions as well as any changes in the chemical industry 
generally.100  
In considering Hexion’s claim, Vice Chancellor Lamb did three 
things. First, the court reiterated, as in IBP, that the question of 
whether or not an adverse event is an MAE/MAC must be evalu-
ated against an assumption that the buyer is buying the target as 
part of a long-term strategy measured in years, not months.101 The 
burden of demonstrating the long-term adverse effect sits with the 
buyer who is seeking to escape performance of the merger con-
tract.102 Second, the court made it clear that in order to evaluate 
 
sector); see Michael J. Halloran & D. Stanley Rowland, Changes in Material Adverse Change 
Provisions in High Tech Deals, M&A LAW., Mar. 1999 (“More exceptions are being grafted 
onto [MAC] provisions because of the high volatility experienced in stock trading prices and 
in economic and market conditions . . . .”). 
 99. Hexion, 965 A.2d at 724. 
 100. Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc., Nimbus 
Merger Sub Inc., and Huntsman Corporation (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 3.1(a)(ii) (July 12, 
2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1307954/000110465907053855/a07-18690_ 
3ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc//CK9G-X7WJ] (defining the “Company Material Adverse Ef-
fect” as “any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that is materially adverse to the 
financial condition, business, or results of operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries, 
taken as a whole; provided, however, that in no event shall any of the following constitute a 
Company Material Adverse Effect: (A) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect 
resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or financial market conditions, 
except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, change, event 
or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a 
whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry; (B) any occurrence, 
condition, change, event or effect that affects the chemical industry generally (including 
changes in commodity prices, general market prices and regulatory changes affecting the 
chemical industry generally) except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occur-
rence, condition, change, event or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company 
and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chem-
ical industry, (C) the outbreak or escalation of hostilities involving the United States, the 
declaration by the United States of war or the occurrence of any natural disasters and acts 
of terrorism, except in the event, and only to the extent, of any damage or destruction to or 
loss of the Company’s or its Subsidiaries’ physical properties . . . .”). 
 101. Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738. 
 102. Id. (“This, of course, is not to say that evidence of a significant decline in earnings 
by the target corporation during the period after signing but prior to the time appointed for 
closing is irrelevant. Rather, it means that for such a decline to constitute a material adverse 
QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  10:08 PM 
2021] MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19 589 
the MAE/MAC carveouts, the court must first determine that there 
had been a MAE/MAC under the traditional MAE/MAC defini-
tion.103 Third, the court must then analyze whether the adverse 
shock has disproportionately affected the target company relative 
to the industry in which the target operated in order to determine 
whether the adverse shock was semi-endogenous and therefore not 
subject to the negotiated carveouts.104 Although Huntsman was not 
performing as well as others in the same industry following the 
onset of the global financial crisis of 2008, the court determined 
that the financial crisis did not reach the level of a traditional 
MAE/MAC as defined, and thus the MAE/MAC was not trig-
gered.105 
Rather than play the role of a force majeure clause as described 
in IBP, in Hexion the court explicitly recognized the new risk-allo-
cation role of modern MAE/MAC clauses, assigning exogenous 
risks to the buyer and endogenous and semi-endogenous risks to 
the target.    
C.  Akorn v. Fresenius 
Akorn represents a watershed moment with respect to 
MAE/MAC clauses.106 Akorn represents the first, and only, case 
where a court has found there to be an adverse event sufficient to 
meet the definition of a MAE/MAC to permit a buyer to walk away 
from the transaction.107 In Akorn, the court held, among other 
things, that (1) target company Akorn’s sudden and sustained drop 
in business performance constituted an MAE; and (2) Akorn’s rep-
resentations regarding regulatory compliance were not true and 
 
effect, poor earnings results must be expected to persist significantly into the future.”). 
 103. Id. at 739–40. 
 104. Id. at 737 (“The plain meaning of the carve-outs found in the proviso is to prevent 
certain occurrences which would otherwise be MAE’s being found to be so. If a catastrophe 
were to befall the chemical industry and cause a material adverse effect in Huntsman’s 
business, the carve-outs would prevent this from qualifying as an MAE under the Agree-
ment. But the converse is not true—Huntsman’s performance being disproportionately 
worse than the chemical industry in general does not, in itself, constitute an MAE. Thus, 
unless the court concludes that the company has suffered an MAE as defined in the lan-
guage coming before the proviso, the court need not consider the application of the chemical 
industry carve-outs.”). 
 105. Id. at 721, 743. 
 106. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
325 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). 
 107. See id. 
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correct, and that this deviation would reasonably be expected to 
result in an MAE.108 
In Akorn, not long after the parties signed the merger agree-
ment, the buyer started to receive anonymous whistleblower ac-
counts from an employee of Akorn alerting it to ongoing fraud in-
volving Akorn’s director of quality assurance.109 The allegations 
were that the director was embezzling from the company by sub-
mitting expenses for quality tests that were never undertaken.110 
Worse, statements that the company had undertaken these phan-
tom quality assurance tests were submitted to the FDA as part of 
the approval process for Akorn’s candidate drugs.111 Submission of 
false data to the FDA obviously called into question the entire ap-
proval process for all the affected drug candidates.112 In response 
to the whistleblower allegations, Akorn approached the FDA and 
“downplayed its problems and oversold its remedial efforts” in a 
misleading presentation to the agency.113 In addition, a few days 
after the parties signed the merger agreement, Akorn’s business 
“dropped off a cliff,” leading to an initial decline in revenues of 
more than 25% followed by continued declines in business perfor-
mance due to loss of an important contract as well as unexpected 
new competition.114 The court observed that Akorn’s year-over-
year quarterly decline in revenue, operating income, and EPS had 
all deteriorated significantly during the pre-closing period.  
                                YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE IN AKORN’S PERFORMANCE115 
  Q2 2017 Q3 2017 Q4 2017 FY 2017 Q1 2018 
     Revenue   (29%) (29%) (34%) (25%) (27%) 
     Operating Income   (84%) (89%) (292%) (105%) (134%) 
     EPS   (96%) (105%) (300%) (113%) (170%) 
 
 
 108. Id. at *109–10. 
 109. Id. at *62. 
 110. Id. at *63–64.                                                                                                                                    
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *151–53. 
 113. Id. at *6. 
 114. Id. at *126–28, *242 tbl.4. 
 115. Id. at *242 tbl.4. 
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After a trial, the Chancery Court found that the causes of 
Akorn’s declining performance were material and durationally sig-
nificant as the decline had already persisted for at least a year and 
showed no signs of abating.116 Although Akorn pointed to industry 
headwinds as the reasons for its poor performance, the company 
vastly underperformed compared to any of its competitors in the 
industry.117 The court found that even if the material adverse effect 
was subject to a carveout, it was semi-endogenous and thus not 
carved out from the MAE definition. The disproportionate impact 
of any economic headwinds on Akorn suggested that the problems 
exemplified by the downturn were specific to the company.118 
The court also identified a MAE/MAC stemming from Akorn’s 
problems with regulatory compliance.119 The parties had agreed to 
a representation in the merger agreement that Akorn had been in 
compliance with all applicable law, including regulatory compli-
ance, subject to a MAE qualifier.120 To the extent any compliance 
failure  resulted in a MAE, the representation would fail to be true 
and accurate at closing, and generate a separate right by the buyer 
to walk away.121 In fact, at trial Fresenius established that Akorn’s 
regulatory difficulties were of such qualitative and quantitative 
significance—causing the FDA to review each and every affected 
drug candidate—that the effect on Akorn’s business was material 
and durationally significant when viewed from the long-term per-
spective of a reasonable acquirer, thus creating a second basis upon 
which the buyer could walk away from the transaction.122 
 
 116. Id. at *126–27. 
 117. Id. at *133, *136 n.616. 
 118. Id. at *134–37. 
 119. Id. at *109–10. 
 120. See id. at *43–45. 
 121. See id. at *183–84, *183 n.761. 
 122. Id. at *193. In a subsequent case, Channel Medsystems v. Boston Scientific, the par-
ties were faced—oddly enough—with a similar set of facts. Improprieties with the quality 
assurance program at Channel Medsystems led them to submit false reports to the FDA. 
Citing Akorn, Boston Scientific sought to terminate the merger agreement. However, the 
structure of the Channel Medsystems agreement was different. The agreement was struc-
tured as an option. In the event Channel Medsystems received approval for its candidate 
drugs by March 2019, then Boston Scientific would be required to complete the purchase. 
In effect, the court was not required to make a ruling on whether the identified improprieties 
rose to the level of a MAE. If the seller could cure the improprieties with the FDA prior to 
the March trigger, then, by definition, the improprieties would not be material adverse 
events and the buyer would be required to close on the transaction. If, on the other hand, 
the improprieties caused the FDA to balk on approval and the March trigger was missed, 
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Although in many areas of the common law an accumulation of 
a large number of cases with various factual scenarios is required 
to distill the view of the court, the opposite has been true with re-
spect to the development of the MAE/MAC jurisprudence. Alt-
hough the MAE/MAC may appear vague, courts, with a single ex-
ception, have uniformly ruled that the factual scenarios typically 
presented by buyers do not represent a MAE/MAC sufficient to 
trigger a walk right. Absent adverse endogenous and semi-endog-
enous events during the executory period, the modern MAE/MAC 
locks buyers into completing transactions. Adverse exogenous 
shocks are a risk that the buyer must absorb while adverse endog-
enous and semi-endogenous shocks are risks best left with the 
seller. There are sound economic reasons for turning the tradi-
tional MAE/MAC on its head and allocating the risks with the par-
ties best able to bear or ameliorate them. Courts, for their part, 
have quickly adopted these rationales. 
IV.  RENEGOTIATIONS IN THE COVID-19 ERA 
Against the backdrop of how courts evaluate MAE/MAC claims 
and how parties to merger agreements are using modern 
MAE/MACs, one can ask whether the conventional wisdom that 
buyers will use the MAE/MAC clauses as a lever to force a renego-
tiation in the event of an adverse event has any purchase. Recent 
experience with the COVID-19 outbreak suggests that the conven-
tional wisdom gets this wrong. The Forescout renegotiation seems 
to be the exception to the rule; though it may not be at second 
glance. Given the relative paucity of renegotiations and court ac-
tions, parties to the merger agreements appear to understand that 
the modern MAE/MAC does not function in response to situations 
like the COVID-19 outbreak as a force majeure clause to facilitat-
ing renegotiations. Rather, it appears that market participants 
have internalized and operationalized the view that the modern 
MAE/MAC acts to apportion risk between buyer and seller, with 
risk of adverse exogenous events borne by the buyer and the risk 
of adverse endogenous events borne by the seller. In that sense, the 
 
then the buyer would be under no obligation to complete the purchase. In any event, the 
seller was able to cure, and the court found that there had not been a MAE. See Channel 
Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., C.A. No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, 
at *12, *16, *32, *39–40, *71, *73 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019). 
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worldwide COVID-19 outbreak is an archetypal exogenous adverse 
shock, the cost of which must be borne by the buyer.  
Of course, it is entirely true that in the wake of the COVID-19 
outbreak targets in pending transactions may well be considerably 
less valuable to buyers over the long term than they were prior to 
COVID-19. It is also likely true that buyers may wish to renegoti-
ate the terms of their pending merger agreements or even cancel 
them altogether. However, doing so would require the seller—who 
will have no control over the operation of the business into the fu-
ture—rather than the buyer to bear the cost of a durationally sig-
nificant, exogenous event. At the same time, the modern 
MAE/MAC does not provide a credible lever for buyers to push the 
cost of a worldwide pandemic onto the shoulders of sellers rather 
than to leave those costs where they had been agreed to rest, on 
the shoulders of buyers.  
The recent experience of LVMH–Tiffany presents a salient ex-
ample. The original merger agreement was agreed to on November 
24, 2019, in advance of the pandemic.123 The agreement included a 
modern MAE/MAC with extensive carveouts and disproportionate-
effect language covering semi-endogenous risks. The agreement 
did not, however, include a specific carveout for pandemics.124 Fol-
lowing the COVID-19 outbreak, the luxury retail business is facing 
what can only be described as adverse shock. Although LVMH con-
sidered whether to declare a MAE/MAC under the terms of the 
agreement and either terminate or renegotiate the price, it de-
clined to do either. Rather, in September 2020, LVMH announced 
that it would permit the deal to hit the outside date and expire on 
November 24, 2020, following a request by French authorities to 
delay the closing of the deal until after January 6, 2021.125 Follow-
ing a declaratory action brought against it by the seller, LVMH 
 
 123. Agreement and Plan of Merger By and Among Tiffany & Co., LVMH Moet Hen-
nessy-Louis Vuitton SE, Breakfast Holdings Acquisition Corp., and Breakfast Acquisition 
Corp. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter LVMH–Tiffany Merger Agree-
ment], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000119312519299997/d840067dex2 
1.htm [https://perma.cc/YU36-VFWQ]. 
 124. The “acts of God” carveout, which would typically include the pandemic carveout, 
included only carveouts for “hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake or other natural disas-
ter.” Id. § 1.1. Arguably, a pandemic might fall under the general rubric of a natural disas-
ter. 
 125. Andrea Felsted, LVMH Finds a Convenient Excuse to Dump Tiffany, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 9, 2020, 8:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-09/lvmh-find 
s-a-convenient-excuse-to-dump-tiffany [https://perma.cc/D9A3-E9V8]. 
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filed a countersuit in which it argued that there had been a 
MAE/MAC despite initially declining to declare a MAE/MAC and 
attempting to walk away.126 
LVMH’s argument was three-fold. First, it argued that COVID-
19 was a material adverse event that had not been carved out from 
the agreement.127 LVMH argued that Tiffany could have sought a 
specific carveout against the occurrence of a pandemic but did 
not.128 Therefore, Tiffany should bear the cost of the subsequent 
occurrence of this unforeseeable exogenous event. Of course, to the 
extent courts believe the economic rationale for modern MAE/MAC 
clauses, this reasoning is unsatisfying. There is no particular rea-
son to believe that Tiffany’s, rather than the buyer, is in a better 
position to ameliorate the ongoing effects of a global pandemic. To 
rule for LVMH would merely reward the buyer for its good fortune 
that the exogenous adverse shock happened not to be on its enu-
merated list of carveouts. LVMH’s second argument, one with per-
haps more purchase, was that even if the COVID-19 pandemic is 
covered as an act of God, it was a semi-endogenous risk, the cost of 
which should properly be allocated to Tiffany and not LVMH.129 As 
evidence, LVMH pointed to the poor performance of shopping malls 
and tourist destinations, which LVMH argued were responsible for 
a significant portion of Tiffany’s sales.130 
LVMH’s final argument was not related to the MAE/MAC at all. 
LVMH argued that when Tiffany’s shut its retail operations in re-
sponse to the government-mandated shutdowns across the coun-
try, it nevertheless continued to pay its regular dividend rather 
than conserve cash. LVMH’s argument was, in effect, that in re-
sponse to the COVID-19 outbreak the “ordinary course” covenant 
required Tiffany’s to conserve cash rather than to continue to pay 
it in the form of dividends.131  
Ultimately, the parties renegotiated the terms of the merger 
agreement rather than proceeding to litigation. However, the 
terms of the renegotiation suggest it was more of a fig leaf than a 
 
 126. LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint, supra note 10, 
at 1–2. 
 127. Id. at 2. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 3. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 9. 
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substantive reapportionment of the costs of the pandemic. First 
and foremost, the parties agreed to reduce the price term from 
$135/share to $131.50/share, a 2.6% reduction.132 It is hard to ar-
gue that a 2.6% reduction in value represents a material redistri-
bution of the risk associated with the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. 
This price reduction was not costless to the buyer, however. In ex-
change for a price reduction, the seller received a number of valu-
able changes to the terms of original agreement. These included a 
specific agreement to permit Tiffany’s to make dividend payments 
to its shareholders, as well as an agreement that, in the event Tif-
fany’s must go to court to seek performance of the merger agree-
ment again, the merger consideration for purposes of determining 
damages would revert to $135/share.133 In addition, the amended 
merger agreement removed a number of conditions to the merger, 
including the absence of a legal constraint to closing which might 
permit LVMH to refrain from closing if there was an order enjoin-
ing the agreement (one such purported order from the government 
of France was at issue in the litigation).134 Finally, the parties re-
defined “Material Adverse Effect” in the amended agreement. The 
amended definition specifically carved out any COVID-19-related 
risks, thus placing COVID-related risks squarely on the shoulders 
of the buyer.135 In short, after LVMH refused to close its acquisition 
of Tiffany, pointing to the global pandemic, it ultimately agreed to 
a face-saving, modest price reduction while giving the seller addi-
tional closing certainty and assurance that in the event of further 
buyer backsliding the seller would be permitted to recoup the orig-
inal merger consideration should a court be forced to award dam-
ages.  
In another COVID-19 MAE/MAC case before the Delaware 
Chancery Court, AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts 
One LLC,136 Vice Chancellor Laster was asked to rule when Mirae 
Asset Daewoo Co. and affiliates from South Korea sought to walk 
 
 132. Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger By and Among Tiffany & 
Co., LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, Breakfast Holdings Acquisition Corp., and 
Breakfast Acquisition Corp. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Oct. 28, 2020) [hereinafter LVMH–
Tiffany Amended Merger Agreement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000 
119312520280456/d91099dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/KH8V-DZBP]. 
 133. Id. § 10.6. 
 134. Tiffany & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 28, 2020). 
 135. LVMH–Tiffany Amended Merger Agreement, supra note 132, § 1.1. 
 136. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL, 
2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020). 
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away from an agreement to purchase certain assets from Chinese 
Anbang Insurance Group. Mirae made two arguments related to 
COVID-19. First, that the buyer was not required to close because 
COVID-19 amounted to a MAE/MAC, causing the bringdown con-
dition to fail. Second, that in response to COVID-19, the Anbang 
Group made significant changes in its hotel business during the 
executory period and thus violated its covenant to run the business 
in the ordinary course between signing and closing.137  
With respect to the first issue, Vice Chancellor Laster found 
that, notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not negotiated 
for a specific “pandemic” carveout, the carveout for “natural disas-
ters and calamities” was sufficiently broad to cover a naturally oc-
curring global pandemic. Thus, while COVID-19 might be a 
MAE/MAC, the risk of a pandemic occurring during the executory 
period was an exogenous risk that properly fell on the shoulders of 
the buyer. Consequently, Mirae could not refuse to close on account 
of a MAE/MAC since the bringdown condition had not failed.138 
 With respect to Mirae’s ordinary-course argument, however, the 
court felt differently. Buyer argued that when Anbang made mate-
rial changes to the operations of its businesses in response to the 
pandemic, the company breached its obligation to run the business 
in the ordinary course consistent with past practice. Anbang ar-
gued that it ran the business in the ordinary course given the cur-
rent circumstances. The court found that the buyer had the better 
of this argument and ruled that seller had breached its ordinary 
course, thus permitting the buyer to refuse to close the transac-
tion.139  
 Similarly, Sycamore Partners sought to terminate its February 
20, 2020, merger agreement with L Brands to acquire Victoria’s 
Secret. Although Sycamore considered renegotiating the merger 
agreement, it sued to terminate the merger agreement after efforts 
to renegotiate were rebuffed by L Brands.140 In its suit, Sycamore 
 
 137. Id. at *1. 
 138. Id. at *48. 
 139. Id.  
 140. James B. Stewart, The Victoria’s Secret Contract That Anticipated a Pandemic, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/victorias-secret-syca 
more-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/523R-LTV8]. 
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did not attempt to argue that COVID-19 was a MAE/MAC.141 Pre-
sumably, by February 20, 2020, the prospect of a global pandemic 
was reasonably foreseeable to the parties. The parties had specifi-
cally included a carveout for pandemics in their definition of 
MAE/MAC.142 Although that avenue was contractually available to 
Sycamore, it sought a declaratory judgment against L Brands for 
violating its “ordinary course” covenant because it ceased doing 
business in the ordinary course as the economy shut down, relying 
on the same argument that would eventually be successful in Mi-
rae.143 Ultimately, L Brands and Sycamore agreed to terminate the 
merger agreement without further renegotiation on the price term 
or litigation.144  
The sudden and unexpected deceleration of economic activity in 
the spring and summer of 2020 (including a 33% drop in annual-
ized GDP in the second quarter of 2020) was not only dramatic, but 
it had painful consequences that will likely persist for many years 
to come.145 If COVID-19 is not a material adverse event, then likely 
nothing is. Nevertheless, only a small number of transactions 
(three) took the opportunity to back away from negotiated terms 
and reprice their agreements. The few that did appear to be the 
exception rather than the rule. In addition to L Brands (Victoria’s 
Secret), only three of 258 transactions announced from January 
2018 to June 2020 agreed to mutually terminate their merger 
agreements.146 Indeed, more transactions appear to have been out-
right cancelled (four) than have been renegotiated in response to 
COVID-19.147 The relative paucity of renegotiations following 
 
 141. See Verified Complaint, SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc., No. 2020-0297, 2020 WL 
1970736 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2020). 
 142. Transaction Agreement Between SP VS Buyer LP and L Brands, Inc. (Form 8-K, 
Exhibit 2.1), § 1.01 (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/701985/000095 
010320003347/dp121693_ex0201.htm [https://perma.cc/WE28-HUNA]. 
 143. Verified Complaint, supra note 141, at 1–4. 
 144. Carleton English, L Brands, Sycamore Partners Reach ‘Mutual Agreement’ Termi-
nating Sale of Victoria’s Secret, BARRON’S (May 4, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://www.barrons.com 
/articles/l-brands-sycamore-partners-abandon-victorias-secret-deal-51588627374 [https:// 
perma.cc/7XR5-CL9L]. 
 145. Jeff Cox, Second-Quarter GDP Plunged by Worst-Ever 32.9% Amid Virus-Induced 
Shutdown, CNBC (Jul. 30, 2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/us-gdp-q2-
2020-first-reading.html [https://perma.cc/27A2-9CHG]. 
 146. Review of Merger Agreements Between January 2018 & June 2020 Valued at $500 
Million or Greater (on file with author). 
 147. See Press Release, Hexcel, Woodward and Hexcel Announce Mutual Termination of 
Merger Agreement (Apr. 6, 2020), https://investors.hexcel.com/investor-news/news-details/ 
2020/Woodward-and-Hexcel-Announce-Mutual-Termination-of-Merger-Agreement/default. 
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COVID-19 does not suggest that the pandemic has not had an ad-
verse effect on the business prospects of merger targets. In fact, 
across most industries it most certainly has. However, it does raise 
the question of why so few merger agreements have been subject 
to a renegotiation, especially if the conventional wisdom suggests 
that parties will often use the opportunity of an adverse shock to 
pursue a renegotiation of terms.  
A. Why So Few Renegotiations? 
The conventional wisdom with respect to MAE/MACs is that, 
when faced with an adverse event, buyers will act opportunistically 
to renegotiate the terms of a pending merger agreement because 
there is sufficient ambiguity around whether a buyer will be suc-
cessful in litigation to make any threat to withdraw from the mer-
ger agreement credible. However, two things have happened since 
IBP. First, contracting practices have changed over time. At the 
time IBP was decided, the traditional MAE/MAC was prevalent in 
merger contracting. Indeed, at issue in IBP itself was a traditional 
MAE/MAC. The traditional MAE/MAC is more akin to a tradi-
tional force majeure contract, however, because it is so broadly 
drafted. The traditional MAE/MAC engenders a good deal of ambi-
guity, which Vice Chancellor Strine identified as a feature, not a 
bug. Where there are few or no carveouts to the MAE/MAC defini-
tion, there will be a high degree of ambiguity about what might or 
might not constitute a material adverse event for purposes of per-
mitting the buyer to terminate a transaction or decline to close a 
deal. 
 
aspx [https://perma.cc/R6NN-WN5V] (“The termination . . . is in response to the increasing 
impact on both the aerospace and industrial sectors, and global markets broadly, resulting 
from the health crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.”); Press Release, 
NASDAQ, Stein Mart and Kingswood Announce Mutual Termination of Merger Agreement 
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/stein-mart-and-kingswood-announc 
e-mutual-termination-of-merger-agreement-2020-04-16 [https://perma.cc/G2L6-Y3ME] 
(“The termination . . . is in response to the unpredictable economic conditions resulting from 
the global health crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, uncertainty re-
garding Stein Mart’s ability to satisfy the conditions to closing, and the substantial expense 
to Stein Mart of soliciting shareholder approval for a transaction which is unlikely to 
close.”); Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. Announces Mutual Agreement to Terminate Pro-
posed Merger With Independent Bank Group, Inc., YAHOO! FIN. (May 26, 2020), https://fin 
ance.yahoo.com/news/texas-capital-bancshares-inc-announces-110010372.html [https://pe 
rma.cc/YU88-8TU5] (stating that the termination was due to “the significant impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on global markets and on the companies’ ability to fully realize the 
benefits they expected to achieve through the merger.”). 
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Where the MAE/MAC is deployed in its traditional form without 
carveouts, the attendant high degree of ambiguity gives rise to in-
centives to litigate and therefore renegotiate in the face of an ad-
verse event, even if the event is not obviously a MAE/MAC. This is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom with respect to how par-
ties to a merger agreement will manage pre-closing adverse 
shocks.  
However, over time, contracting practices have changed, and the 
work that the MAE/MAC does has changed as well. Rather than 
act as a force majeure/frustration clause, the MAE/MAC has taken 
on an altogether different role. The effect of the carveouts and dis-
proportionate-effect language has flipped the MAE/MAC on its 
head. No longer does the MAE/MAC permit the buyer to terminate 
a merger contract due to a force majeure event. In fact, the buyer 
is required to close the transaction in spite of force majeure events 
given the modern MAE/MAC formulation. Rather, the modern 
MAE/MAC only permits the buyer to terminate the merger con-
tract in the event an adverse shock endogenous to the seller occurs 
between signing and closing (as in Akorn).  
A study from 1998–2005 found that 9% of transactions in the 
study sample suffered a MAE/MAC. MAE/MAC clauses in that 
study were mostly traditional MAE/MAC clauses or had few carve-
outs. These traditional MAE/MAC clauses, or slim MAE/MAC 
clauses, were responsible for 80% of all deal renegotiations leading 
to reductions in deal prices that averaged 15%.148 The conventional 
wisdom suggests that following the COVID-19 outbreak, buyers 
should take the opportunity to renegotiate terms of transactions to 
reflect new, lower valuations, like they did during the 1998–2005 
period. However, there have been relatively few such renegotia-
tions. The reasons for this may be twofold. First, parties who seek 
to renegotiate systematically overestimate litigation costs as well 
as the likelihood of successfully arguing an exogenous event like 
COVID-19 is an adverse event within the definition of a modern 
MAE/MAC. Consequently, buyers and sellers who do not renegoti-
ate understand that threats to litigate lack credibility because buy-
ers are extremely unlikely to succeed. Absent a credible threat of 
buyer contract failure, sellers appear willing to force buyers to ac-
cept even inefficient transactions that represent a net loss in terms 
 
 148. Denis & Macias, supra note 23, at 819–21 (finding that MACs are responsible for 
80% of renegotiations of merger agreements). 
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of transaction surplus and distribution of rents to the seller rather 
than to agree to share the cost of losses during the executory pe-
riod. Second, the modern MAE/MAC has a very different role in the 
merger agreement. Over time, what started as a force majeure/ 
frustration clause has flipped on its head to more tightly commit a 
buyer to complete a transaction by drastically narrowing the scope 
of permissible excuse from performance. 
In the context of a traditional MAE/MAC, a pandemic like 
COVID-19 is an axiomatic adverse event, and thus should be a 
credible lever to force a renegotiation. However, given the funda-
mental transformation of the role of the MAE/MAC clause in mer-
ger agreements since the landmark 2001 MAE/MAC case, IBP, this 
is no longer the case. The MAE/MAC at issue in IBP, consistent 
with the time, was a traditional MAE/MAC with no carveouts. Vice 
Chancellor Strine observed that such a “provision is best read as a 
backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown 
events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of 
the target in a durationally-significant manner.”149 He also prog-
nosticated that interpreting a traditional MAE/MAC in any other 
manner would “encourage the negotiation of extremely detailed 
‘MAC’ clauses with numerous carve-outs or qualifiers. An approach 
that reads broad clauses as addressing fundamental events that 
would materially affect the value of a target to a reasonable ac-
quiror eliminates the need for drafting of that sort.”150 However, 
subsequent development of the MAE/MAC clause in practice sug-
gests the Vice Chancellor got that exactly backwards. The inherent 
vagueness of a broadly written traditional MAE/MAC creates an 
incentive for parties to transform MAE/MAC terms from a broad, 
buyer-friendly force majeure/frustration clause to a provision that 
allocates exogenous risk explicitly to the buyer.  
The structure of MAE/MAC clauses deployed prior to IBP sug-
gests that MAE/MAC clauses were still playing the role of force 
majeure/frustration clauses at that time. Given that exogenous 
events are captured within the definition of force majeure clauses, 
there is significant indefiniteness about what may constitute a 
MAE/MAC. Consequently, traditional MAE/MAC clauses are a 
 
 149. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 n.155 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 150. Id. 
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credible lever for forcing renegotiations, even inefficient renegoti-
ations that impose the costs of adverse exogenous events on sellers. 
However, since IBP in 2001, practice has transitioned away from 
the traditional MAE/MAC towards a broad adoption of modern 
MAE/MAC clauses with their extensive use of carveouts.151  
Very few, if any, merger agreements now rely on traditional 
MAE/MACs. This represents a dramatic transformation of the 
MAE/MAC clause over the past two decades.152 The modern 
MAE/MAC, with its large number of carveouts, is a relatively re-
cent development. For example, in the classic 1975 tome on merger 
agreements Anatomy of a Merger by James Freund, there is barely 
a passing reference to the role of MAE/MAC clauses.153 The 2001 
ABA Model Asset Purchase Agreement, which acts as a template 
for many practicing lawyers, proffers a traditional definition of a 
MAE/MAC for its model agreement.154 The salient points for dis-
cussion for the model agreement relate not to carveouts or semi-
endogenous risks, but to whether or not the addition of “prospects” 
to the traditional definition of a MAE/MAC is appropriate. The 
commentary to the Model Agreement suggests that sellers may at-
tempt to negotiate one or more of the following carveouts:  
(i) any change resulting from conditions affecting the industry in 
which Seller operates or from changes in general business or economic 
conditions; (ii) any change resulting from the announcement or pen-
dency of any of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement; or 
(iii) any change resulting from compliance by Seller with the terms of, 
 
 151. This phenomenon is consistent with the observation by Professor Jennejohn of 
“mass customization” of merger agreements within merger practice. Matthew Jennejohn, 
The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 72 (2018). Professor Mitu Gulati 
et al. also observe similar phenomena with respect to the development of the use of specific-
performance provisions in merger agreements since 2001. See Theresa Arnold, Amanda 
Dixon, Hadar Tanne, Madison Sherrill & Mitu Gulati, Lipstick on a Pig: Specific Perfor-
mance Clauses in Action, __ WIS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021). 
 152. The phenomenon of contractual innovation, particularly with respect to the devel-
opment of merger agreements, has been the subject of a good deal of recent serious study. 
See, e.g., Jennejohn, supra note 151, at 72–73; Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal 
Structure, 113 NW. L. REV. 279 (2018); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient 
Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu 
Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 
1 (2017); John C. Coates, IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years 
of Deals (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 889, 2016), https://pap 
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019 [https://perma.cc/VU9F-QZQT]. 
 153. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 259–61 (1975) (discussing the “Absence 
of Certain Changes” representation). 
 154. MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY § 3.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2001). 
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or the taking of any action contemplated or permitted by, this Agree-
ment.155 
Indeed, the commentary suggests that, if a buyer agrees to one 
or more of these proposed carveouts, the buyer should insist that 
the carveout be subject not to the now-common disproportionate-
effect language but to a “standard of proof” that the adverse change 
“was proximately caused by one of the circumstances” described in 
the carveout.156   
In their 2001 article, Professors Gilson and Schwartz observed 
the beginnings of a shift in contracting practice away from the tra-
ditional MAE/MAC. In the merger contracts they identified from 
1993, only 18.33% included one or two carveouts from the tradi-
tional MAE/MAC definition; more than half identified only one 
carveout.157 In 1995, 31.7% of the transactions Gilson and 
Schwartz identified included more than one carveout.158 By 2000, 
they identified carveouts in 83% of transactions in their dataset, 
with an average of only 3.75 carveouts per transaction.159 Con-
sistent with their view that assignment of exogenous risk to the 
buyer is an efficient device to mitigate seller moral hazard, Profes-
sors Gilson and Schwartz argued that the use of carveouts should 
be concentrated in technology acquisitions where information 
asymmetries between buyer and seller are more obvious.160 How-
ever, subsequent developments suggest more widespread ac-
ceptance of MAE/MAC carveouts. A 2012 MAE/MAC study by Pro-
fessors Denis and Macias, relying on data from 1998–2005, 
observed that the vast majority of merger agreements had few, if 
any, carveouts from the MAE/MAC definition.161 Professors Denis 
 
 155. Id. § 3.15 cmt. 
 156. Id. (responding to the criticism of the MAE/MAC as being a vague contract term). 
 157. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 350. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 350, 354. Kenneth Adams also observed in 2004 that the extensive use of 
carveouts to MAEs was common in technology-sector acquisitions but not broader. See Ad-
ams, supra note 32, at 43–45. 
 161. Denis & Macias, supra note 23, at 825. Denis and Macias document the presence of 
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and Macias’s data included no MAE/MAC clauses with carveouts 
for pandemics, force majeure, or acts of God.162  
By 2019, there was a near-complete transition away from the 
traditional MAE/MAC and adoption across all sectors of M&A 
practice of modern MAE/MAC clauses. Survey data from 2019 of 
U.S. public company deals greater than $1 billion found that 
MAE/MAC clauses had an average of more than fourteen carveouts 
with a high degree of uniformity across industries.163 In addition 
to the increase in reliance on contracts, transition to modern 
MAE/MAC clauses also includes the use of disproportionate-effect 
language, which permits consideration of an exogenous effect oth-
erwise excluded by a carveout if it disproportionately affects the 
target. Survey data in 2009 and 2010 saw 48% and 40% of trans-
actions relying on such language. In 2019, 87% of public company 
transactions included disproportionate-effect language.164 Simi-
larly, 2019 survey data showed that 82% of public deals larger than 
$1 billion included carveouts for acts of God and 19% included 
carveouts for calamities.165 Professors Jennejohn, Nyarko, and Tal-
ley conducted a review of over 1700 transactions between 2003 and 
2020 for incidence of carveouts related to pandemics.166 Although 
they found the incidence of a specific carveout for pandemics to be 
relatively low, they noted a trend over time to increase the number 
 
 
Year % with MAE/MAC % with Carveouts Aver Carveouts 
1998 100.00% 60.4% 2.8 
1999 98.8% 61.1% 2.7 
2000 99.2% 75.6% 3.8 
2001 97.9% 85.4% 4.4 
2002 100.0% 90.9% 5.4 
2003 100.0% 93.4% 5.3 
2004 100.0% 91.4% 6.0 
2005 100.0% 97.7% 7.2 
Total 99.3% 75.6% 4.0 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. NIXON PEABODY, MAC SURVEY: NP 2019 REPORT 7 (2019), https://www.nixonpeabo 
dy.com/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2019-nixon-peabody.ashx?la=en [https://per 
ma.cc/Y77B-E7PB]. 
 164. Id. at 4. 
 165. Id. at 9. 
 166. Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko & Eric Talley, COVID-19 As a Force Majeure in 
Corporate Transactions 1–3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 625, 2020), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577701 [https://perma.cc/N7DG-N2NW]. 
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of carveouts, including carveouts for pandemics. By 2019, they 
found that 23% of transactions in their sample included carveouts 
for pandemics.167  
This author’s own review of merger agreements with Delaware 
target corporations signed between January 2018 and June 2020 
valued at least $500 million produced a broad sample of MAE/MAC 
clauses, including a number that covered the period after COVID-
19 entered the world stage. Many of the MAE/MAC clauses include 
carveouts directly or reasonably applicable to the COVID-19 out-
break, including carveouts for epidemics or pandemics, national 
emergencies, as well as carveouts covering force majeure generally. 
The use of disproportionate-impact language to carve-in pandem-
ics in the event the impact on the target was disproportionate to 
the industry in which the target operates was nearly universal. 
 
COVID-19 RELATED CARVEOUTS 
Epidemic (and variations) 67 (25.9%) 
Force Majeure 120 (46.5%) 
National Emergency 17 (6.6%) 
Disproportionate-Impact Language 254 (98.4%) 
 
Where the merger agreement includes a pandemic, national 
emergency, act of God, or other force majeure event as a carveout, 
the occurrence of such an event, without more, would not be per-
mitted to form the basis of a claim that there has been an 
MAE/MAC unless the target is disproportionately affected by the 
pandemic. 
The transition from traditional MAE/MAC clauses with few, if 
any, carveouts to modern MAE/MAC clauses with many carveouts 
and disproportionate-effects language was relatively rapid. Follow-
ing IBP, what had been a niche contracting practice of including a 
large number of carveouts, limited mostly to technology company 
acquisitions, became much more diffuse and was adopted by mer-
ger agreements across all sectors.168 The effect of this shift was to 
 
 167. Id. at 5 (Finding that, in part, the relatively low number of pandemic carveouts can 
be tied to a lack of salience). 
 168. In their study of the evolution of merger agreements, Professors Anderson and 
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turn the MAE/MAC clause on its head. Traditional MAE/MAC 
clauses leave the risk of most durationally significant, exogenous, 
adverse events with sellers rather than buyers. On the other hand, 
the addition of carveouts and disproportionate-effects language 
shifts the risk of exogenous adverse events onto buyers and leaves 
the risk of only endogenous and semi-endogenous events with the 
seller.   
By any measure, the MAE/MAC that LVMH and Tiffany negoti-
ated in their agreement is an example of a modern MAE/MAC. 
LVMH and Tiffany included nine specific carveouts to their defini-
tion of a MAE/MAC, including specific carveouts against changes 
in “general economic or political conditions,” against “any change 
in Law applicable to the Company’s business,” against the occur-
rence of “any hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, or other natu-
ral disaster,” as well as specific carveouts against adverse effects 
attributable to  
geopolitical conditions, the outbreak or escalation of hostilities (in-
cluding the Hong Kong protests and the “Yellow Vest” movement [in 
France]), any acts of war (whether or not declared), sabotage (includ-
ing cyberattacks) or terrorism, or any escalation or worsening of any 
such acts of hostilities, war, sabotage, or terrorism threatened or un-
derway . . . .”169  
 With respect to the agreement’s more specific carveouts that 
touch on a number of salient issues known at the time of the agree-
ment’s November 24, 2019, signing (e.g., the Hong Kong protests 
and the Yellow Vest movement in France), the parties included 
carveouts to specify that those known adverse events would not 
come under the definition of a MAE/MAC for purposes of permit-
ting the buyer to terminate the merger agreement. Notably, the 
parties did not include a specific carveout for pandemics or other 
acts of God in their merger agreement.170 Arguably, general carve-
outs against adverse changes in economic conditions or adverse 
changes in laws should be sufficient to cover the effects of a pan-
demic on Tiffany’s business. However, it does not necessarily follow 
 
Manns argue that evolution of deal terms is path-dependent and eschews deal term stand-
ardization. The experience of the evolution of MAE/MAC clauses suggests that, at least with 
this term, deal term standardization and rapid evolution is certainly possible in merger 
agreements. Anderson & Manns, supra note 152, at 61. 
 169. LVMH–Tiffany Merger Agreement, supra note 123, § 1.1. 
 170. Id. at art. I. 
QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  10:08 PM 
606 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:565 
that the parties intended to allocate exogenous pandemic risk, 
should it occur, to the seller.  
Because the modern MAE/MAC allocates adverse endogenous 
risks to the seller and exogenous risks to the buyer, a more reason-
able reading of a modern MAE/MAC would be one that assigns un-
foreseeable exogenous adverse shocks to the buyer and not the 
seller. Not only would this be consistent with doctrines of excuse 
like frustration and impracticability, which require the risk be un-
foreseen by the parties, but it would be consistent with current un-
derstanding of the MAE/MAC provision’s purpose.171 
While the appearance of pandemics like COVID-19 from time to 
time is entirely foreseeable, their actual appearance is stochastic 
and obviously not within the control of either buyer or seller. The 
pandemic is, in that sense, the archetypical exogenous event. Allo-
cating the risk of a pandemic to a target because the parties failed 
to specifically enumerate it on a list of carveouts is inefficient, as a 
buyer is in the best position to bear the cost of the appearance of a 
pandemic between signing and closing. It is also inconsistent with 
the purpose of the modern MAE/MAC provision in merger agree-
ments. Any other result would irrationally reward a buyer who, 
during the executory period, is “lucky enough” to suffer a pandemic 
rather than any other specified exogenous risk. To the extent there 
remains vagueness in the modern MAE/MAC term, particularly 
the carveouts, parties could resolve this by being more explicit in 
their drafting: allocating exogenous risks to the buyer and endoge-
nous and semi-endogenous risks to the seller. If not, then, contra 
Vice Chancellor Strine, drafters face an incentive to add additional 
carveouts to the ever-increasing list of carveouts, constrained only 
by the drafters’ imagination.172  
 
 171. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
325, at *133–34 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“Consistent with standard practice in the M&A 
industry, the plain language of the Merger Agreement’s definition of a Material Adverse 
Effect generally allocates the risk of endogenous, business-specific events to [the seller] and 
exogenous, systematic risks to [the buyer].”). 
 172. Because most such carveouts will necessarily cover low-probability events, the pre-
sent value to the buyer of accepting such risks should be low, e.g., carveouts for meteor 
strikes, etc., leading to a potential explosion in negotiated carveouts.  In Mirae, Vice Chan-
cellor Laster threaded the needle by ruling that “natural disaster” and “calamity” were suf-
ficiently broad as to encompass pandemics such as COVID-19 for purposes of the carveout 
to the MAE/MAC. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-
0310-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353, at *48 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020). 
QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  10:08 PM 
2021] MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19 607 
B.  When Should One Expect a Renegotiation? 
Although the crux of the conventional wisdom’s argument is that 
the MAE/MAC gives rise to renegotiations, one must note that alt-
hough an adverse shock may generate a motivation for buyers to 
renegotiate, buyers have extremely limited ability to generate 
credible threats to terminate transactions. In the past, when tra-
ditional MAE/MACs were more prevalent, every adverse shock 
could give rise to a potentially credible termination threat and then 
subsequent renegotiation. However, modern MAE/MACs presently 
make up the vast majority of MAE/MAC clauses in merger agree-
ments. Consequently, adverse exogenous shocks that occur be-
tween signing and closing, like the COVID-19 outbreak, will not be 
of the type to generate a credible claim for a MAE/MAC. Therefore, 
buyer threats to terminate transactions due to adverse events like 
COVID-19 are not credible. To the extent a buyer threatens to ter-
minate a transaction due to adverse exogenous shock, such a rene-
gotiation will most likely involve the buyer forcing the seller’s 
shareholders to bear at least some of the cost of the shock, which 
would be inefficient unless the shock represented a semi-endoge-
nous risk.173 Consequently, although the conventional wisdom sug-
gests that the MAE/MAC provision can act as a fulcrum for rene-
gotiation following an adverse shock during the executory period, 
one should not expect such renegotiations to be plentiful. To the 
extent there are renegotiations, one should expect they will be rel-
atively few in number and limited to the following three categories: 
adverse endogenous shocks, adverse semi-endogenous shocks, and 
inefficient renegotiations. 
Adverse Endogenous Shocks. Following Akorn, it is clear that 
there is relatively little ambiguity surrounding the interpretation 
of modern MAE/MAC clauses: courts will enforce them where they 
involve adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous shocks. Adverse 
exogenous shocks, like the COVID-19 outbreak, will not trigger a 
buyer’s right to terminate and their occurrence does not generate 
a credible termination threat sufficient to initiate a renegotiation. 
On the other hand, where the seller has experienced an adverse 
endogenous risk between signing and closing, a buyer’s claim to a 
MAE/MAC is credible. In such situations, both sides’ positions may 
be improved by a renegotiation of the merger agreement’s terms 
 
 173. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 339. 
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compared to the alternative, which would have the buyer lose ac-
cess to the seller and leave the seller to fend for itself—or even 
fail—without a transaction.174 For example, following the an-
nouncement of its merger agreement with Verizon in 2016, Yahoo 
disclosed a massive data breach.175 As a result of the data breach, 
Verizon threatened to declare a MAE/MAC and walk away from 
the transaction unless Yahoo renegotiated the terms of the sale. 
Verizon’s threat was clearly credible. The data breach was mate-
rial and it was a risk endogenous to Yahoo and no one else. The 
cost of the breach should properly have been borne by the seller. 
The subsequent renegotiation reduced the consideration to Yahoo 
shareholders by $350 million and the transaction moved to clos-
ing.176  
The Akorn–Fresenius transaction involved an endogenous ad-
verse event (disclosure of fraud internal to the target).177 The effect 
of the adverse disclosure was to significantly reduce Fresenius’s 
valuation of Akorn. Post-disclosure, Akorn was not worth nearly 
what had been offered. Subsequent to the disclosure, a termination 
threat by Fresenius should have been credible. Had Fresenius ini-
tiated a renegotiation, it would have reflected a revised valuation 
for Akorn and would have been efficient relative to the alternative 
of termination.  
The Forescout–Advent renegotiation is another example of this 
dynamic playing out. Epidemics and pandemics were clearly 
carved out from the MAE/MAC definition in the merger agree-
ment. Ultimately, COVID-19 likely did not create the circum-
stances that permitted a renegotiation, although the pandemic 
likely was responsible for the buyer reevaluating its valuation of 
 
 174. See Olivia Rockman & Jeff Feeley, Akorn Seeks Bankruptcy After Failed Takeover, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-
12/akorn-pursues-sale-and-process-may-include-bankruptcy-filing [https://perma.cc/2K4P-
RULJ]. 
 175. Steven Davidoff Solomon, How Yahoo’s Data Breach Could Affect Its Deal with Ver-
izon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/business/dealbook/ 
how-yahoos-data-breach-could-affect-its-deal-with-verizon.html [https://perma.cc/9WQ7-R 
QG4]; David Shepardson, Verizon Says Yahoo Hack “Material,” Could Affect Deal, REUTERS 
(Oct. 13, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-verizon-yahoo-cyber-idUSK 
CN12D2PW [https://perma.cc/UE5S-7XE3]; Ingrid Lunden, After Data Breaches, Verizon 
Knocks $350M Off Yahoo Sale, Now Valued at $4.48B, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 21, 2017, 8:34 
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/21/verizon-knocks-350m-off-yahoo-sale-after-data-bre 
aches-now-valued-at-4-48b/ [https://perma.cc/HB97-UY5N]. 
 176. Lunden, supra note 175.   
 177. Rockman & Feeley, supra note 174. 
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the company. Rather, the claimed appearance of whistleblower al-
legations of financial improprieties represented an endogenous ad-
verse event during the executory period. Advent’s threat not to 
close the transaction was credible not due to the pandemic but due 
to the appearance of an endogenous risk. Rather than litigate, the 
parties renegotiated the terms, with Forescout shareholders ab-
sorbing the cost of the exogenous adverse event. To the extent the 
whistleblower allegations were real, this result was an efficient re-
sult for both buyer and seller, because it forced the seller to disclose 
otherwise private information rather than risk litigating in the 
manner described by Choi and Triantis.178  
Adverse Semi-Endogenous Shocks. Similarly, adverse semi-en-
dogenous shocks can be the credible impetus for efficient renegoti-
ations. For example, LVMH argued that Tiffany’s suffered a semi-
endogenous adverse shock due to COVID-19. LVMH claimed that 
COVID-19 reduced Tiffany’s valuation to a degree disproportionate 
with its peers due to the placement of Tiffany’s retail locations in 
malls and dependence on tourism-based trade. If true, LVMH 
would have been in a position to credibly threaten termination or 
initiate an efficient renegotiation of the terms of the transaction.  
Inefficient Renegotiations. While renegotiation in the face of en-
dogenous and semi-endogenous adverse shocks will likely be effi-
cient, there is also a category of inefficient renegotiations that are 
possible because the threat of buyer contract failure in response to 
an adverse exogenous event is credible. In such scenarios, the re-
negotiations are likely going to be inefficient because the buyer will 
force the target company’s shareholders to bear the cost of the 
buyer’s potential contract failure through a redistribution of the 
merger agreement’s terms. For most strategic acquirors, the pro-
spect of contract failure due to an adverse exogenous event is ex-
tremely rare. However, for financial buyers relying on thinly capi-
talized shell corporations at arm’s length from the transaction 
sponsor, the prospect of contract failure due to an adverse exoge-
nous event during the executory period that cuts off access to 
lender financing is not necessarily a remote prospect.179  
 
 178. Choi & Triantis, supra note 23, at 859. 
 179. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 510–
12 (2009); Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 817–
20 (2009). 
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 CONCLUSION 
Although the conventional wisdom suggests that, following ad-
verse shocks like the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, parties to 
merger agreements would have leaned on MAE/MAC provisions to 
preserve those agreements by renegotiating the terms, in fact, fol-
lowing the rapid onset of COVID-19 there was no rush to the rene-
gotiation table by parties to merger agreements. The relative pau-
city of renegotiations suggests that the conventional wisdom either 
misunderstands the role of the modern MAE/MAC or at least over-
estimates the degree of ambiguity that surrounds current enforce-
ment of the provision. Courts as well as drafters have adopted an 
approach that reflects the view offered by Professors Gilson and 
Schwartz that modern MAE/MAC provisions no longer function as 
force majeure clauses providing buyers the ability to walk away 
from transactions. Rather, modern MAE/MAC provisions allocate 
exogenous adverse risks to the buyer while making sellers respon-
sible for adverse endogenous risks that might appear during the 
executory period.  
Where adverse exogenous events appear, sellers have very 
strong contractual claims to enforcement of the merger agreement 
and consequently no incentive to pursue renegotiation of the mer-
ger terms. To the extent adverse endogenous or semi-endogenous 
risks present themselves during the executory period, parties still 
have incentives to efficiently renegotiate the contract terms and 
can do so. Similarly, where the buyer faces the prospect of contract 
failure as a result of an adverse exogenous risk, sellers may prefer 
renegotiating to enforcing their contract rights.  
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APPENDIX: REPRESENTATIVE MAE 
The material adverse effect clause in Advent’s February 2020 
acquisition of Forescout is representative. It reads as follows:  
“Company Material Adverse Effect” means any change, 
event, violation, inaccuracy, effect or circumstance (each, an “Ef-
fect”) that, individually or taken together with all other Effects 
that exist or have occurred prior to the date of determination of the 
occurrence of the Company Material Adverse Effect, (A) has had or 
would reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on 
the business, financial condition or results of operations of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole; or (B) would rea-
sonably be expected to prevent or materially impair or delay the 
consummation of the Merger, it being understood that, in the case 
of clause (A) or clause (B), none of the following (by itself or when 
aggregated) will be deemed to be or constitute a Company Material 
Adverse Effect or will be taken into account when determining 
whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred or may, 
would or could occur (subject to the limitations set forth below): 
     (i) changes in general economic conditions in the United States or 
any other country or region in the world, or changes in conditions in 
the global economy generally (except to the extent that such Effect has 
had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company rel-
ative to other companies of a similar size operating in the industries 
in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which 
case only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be 
taken into account in determining whether there has occurred a Com-
pany Material Adverse Effect); 
     (ii) changes in conditions in the financial markets, credit markets 
or capital markets in the United States or any other country or region 
in the world, including (A) changes in interest rates or credit ratings 
in the United States or any other country; (B) changes in exchange 
rates for the currencies of any country; or (C) any suspension of trad-
ing in securities (whether equity, debt, derivative or hybrid securities) 
generally on any securities exchange or over-the-counter market op-
erating in the United States or any other country or region in the 
world (except, in each case, to the extent that such Effect has had a 
materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to 
other companies of a similar size operating in the industries in which 
the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case 
only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken 
into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company 
Material Adverse Effect); 
     (iii) changes in conditions in the industries in which the Company 
and its Subsidiaries conduct business (except to the extent that such 
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Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the 
Company relative to other companies of a similar size operating in the 
industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct busi-
ness, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse im-
pact may be taken into account in determining whether there has oc-
curred a Company Material Adverse Effect); 
     (iv) changes in regulatory, legislative or political conditions (includ-
ing the imposition or adjustment of tariffs) in the United States or any 
other country or region in the world (except to the extent that such 
Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the 
Company relative to other companies of similar size operating in the 
industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct busi-
ness, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse im-
pact may be taken into account in determining whether there has oc-
curred a Company Material Adverse Effect); 
     (v) any geopolitical conditions, outbreak of hostilities, acts of war, 
sabotage, terrorism or military actions (including any escalation or 
general worsening of any such hostilities, acts of war, sabotage, ter-
rorism or military actions) in the United States or any other country 
or region in the world (except to the extent that such Effect has had a 
materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to 
other companies of similar size operating in the industries in which 
the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case 
only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken 
into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company 
Material Adverse Effect); 
     (vi) earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes, floods, mud-
slides, wild fires or other natural disasters, weather conditions, epi-
demics, pandemics and other force majeure events in the United 
States or any other country or region in the world (except to the extent 
that such Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect 
on the Company relative to other companies of similar size operating 
in the industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct 
business, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse 
impact may be taken into account in determining whether there has 
occurred a Company Material Adverse Effect) (emphasis added); 
     (vii) any Effect resulting from the announcement of this Agreement 
or the pendency of the Merger, including the impact thereof on the 
relationships, contractual or otherwise, of the Company and its Sub-
sidiaries with employees, suppliers, customers, partners, vendors, 
Governmental Authorities or any other third Person (other than for 
purposes of any representation and warranty contained in Section 
3.5); 
     (viii) the compliance (other than compliance with the covenant to 
operate in the ordinary course of business pursuant to Section 5.1) by 
any Party with the terms of this Agreement, including any action 
taken or refrained from being taken pursuant to or in accordance with 
this Agreement; 
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     (ix) any action taken or refrained from being taken, in each case to 
which Parent has expressly approved, consented to or requested in 
writing (including via email) following the date of this Agreement; 
(x) changes or proposed changes in GAAP or other accounting stand-
ards or applicable Law (or the enforcement or interpretation of any of 
the foregoing) or changes in the regulatory accounting requirements 
applicable to any industry in which the Company and its Subsidiaries 
operate (except to the extent that such Effect has had a materially 
disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to other com-
panies of a similar size operating in the industries in which the Com-
pany and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case only the 
incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken into ac-
count in determining whether there has occurred a Company Material 
Adverse Effect); 
     (xi) changes in the price or trading volume of the Company Com-
mon Stock, in each case in and of itself (it being understood that any 
cause of such change may be deemed to constitute, in and of itself, a 
Company Material Adverse Effect and may be taken into considera-
tion when determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect 
has occurred); 
     (xii) any failure, in and of itself, by the Company and its Subsidi-
aries to meet (A) any public estimates or expectations of the Com-
pany’s revenue, earnings or other financial performance or results of 
operations for any period; or (B) any internal budgets, plans, projec-
tions or forecasts of its revenues, earnings or other financial perfor-
mance or results of operations (it being understood that any cause of 
any such failure may be deemed to constitute, in and of itself, a Com-
pany Material Adverse Effect and may be taken into consideration 
when determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has 
occurred); 
     (xiii) the availability or cost of equity, debt or other financing to 
Parent or Merger Sub; 
     (xiv) any Transaction Litigation or other Legal Proceeding threat-
ened, made or brought by any of the current or former Company Stock-
holders (on their own behalf or on behalf of the Company) against the 
Company, any of its executive officers or other employees or any mem-
ber of the Company Board arising out of the Merger or any other 
transaction contemplated by this Agreement; and 
     (xv) any matters expressly disclosed in the Company Disclosure 
Letter. 
 
